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PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL'S DRAFT 
ELIGIBILITY RULE: THE LABOR EXEMPTION 
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
by Robert A. McCormick* and 
Matthew C. McKinnon** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Each season there are several extraordinarily talented athletes 
whose ability to play professional football before their college eligi-
bility expires is undisputed. The most recent and dramatic exam-
ple of this phenomenon is Herschel Walker.1 At the conclusion of 
* Profj!ssor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.A., Michigan State University, 1969; J.D., 
University of Michigan Law School, 1973. 
** Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.S., University of Detroit, 1961; J.D., 
Detroit College of Law, 1972. 
The authors would like to thank Emily Lewis, Detroit College of Law, January 1983, for 
her many contributions to this article. 
' Walker is focused upon only as the prototype of a class of persons: amateur football 
players whose services would be sought by professional teams but for the restraints of the 
National Football League's draft eligibility rule. Virtually every superlative has been used to 
describe his athletic ability. He has been described as "the perfect football machine, the 
ultimate merger of movement and might." Smith, All Alone in the Open Field, INSIDE 
SPORTS, Sept. 1981, at 28. Walker stands six feet, two inches tall, weighs two hundred 
twenty pounds and has been timed at ten and twenty-three hundredths seconds for the one 
hundred meter sprint making Walker among the two dozen fastest runners in the world. 
Herschel Gets His Heisman, TIME, Dec. 13, 1982, at 80. Coaches appear given to hyperbole 
in describing Walker. For example, University of Tennessee coach Johnny Majors described 
Walker as having "more going for him than any player who's ever played the game. He is 
something God puts on this earth every several decades or so." I d. Georgia Tech coach Bill 
Curry said, "Herschel is just the biggest, fastest football player who ever lived." Id. 
The eyes of the sporting world fell upon Walker when he was still in high school. Walker 
was the state high school champion in events as disparate as the shot put and the one 
hundred yard dash. He set national high school football records by scoring eighty-six touch-
downs in his school career and forty-five in his senior year alone. That year he lead his team 
to the Georgia state high school championship. He was a consensus high school All-Ameri-
can and Parade Magazine's national high school back of the year. Stories about efforts by 
colleges to recruit him are legion. See, e.g., L. SMITH & L. GRIZZARD, GLORY, GLORY 71-73 
(1981). 
As a college freshman at the University of Georgia, his accomplishments continued to 
multiply. Walker gained more rushing yardage than any freshman in the history of the 
game. He finished third in the balloting for the Heisman Trophy-the first time a freshman 
had ever appeared in the top ten. He led the University of Georgia to a 1981 Sugar Bowl 
victory over Notre Dame, a game in which he was voted Most Valuable Player. Smith, 
supra, at 29. Georgia also had an undefeated season and won its first national championship 
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the 1980 season-Walker's first as a collegian-United Press Inter-
national declared him the "National Back of the Year" and he was 
named first team All-American by every association acknowledging 
such achievement.s.2 In 1981, Walker's sophomore season, his 
achievements mounted and records continued to fall. 3 After 
Walker's junior year, he was awarded the Reisman Memorial Tro-
phy as the nation's outstanding collegiate player for 1982.4 With 
one year of college eligibility remaining, Walker had already gar-
nered ten National Collegiate Athletic Association records and was 
third on the all-time NCAA rushing list.5 
In February of 1983, Walker stunned followers of college and 
professional football6 when he signed a three year contract with 
in 1981. Kirkpatrick, More Than Georgia's on His Mind, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 31, 
1981, at 44, 45. 
2 Sporting News Sugar Bowl Media Guide, Jan. 1, 1983, at 26. These associations are 
the Football Writers Association (first freshman in history), Kodak (first freshman in his-
tory), Walter Camp, Associated Press, and United Press International. I d. Walker's achieve-
ments in track and field were nearly as remarkable: He qualified for both the indoor and 
outdoor National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) championships. Invitations to 
compete were extended to Walker from the prestigious Millrose Games, Martin Luther King 
Games, and Drake Relays. He was the country's seventh fastest collegiate sprinter at the 
100 meter distance in 1981 and was a member of the 1981 NCAA Outdoor All-American 
team. Id. 
3 Id. Walker was the Associated Press' "Back of the Week" on two occasions and 
United Press International's (UPI) "Offensive Player of the Week" three times. Again a 
unanimous first team All-American, Walker was second in balloting for the Heisman Tro-
phy. Id. 
• Walker Finally Wins Heisman, Detroit Free Press, Dec. 5, 1982, at 2E, col. 1. 
• Sugar Bowl Media Guide, supra note 2, at 26-27. 
Most Yards Rushing by a Freshman in One Season: 1,616 in 1980 
Most Yards Rushing by a Sophomore in One Season: 1,891 in 1981 
Most Yards Rushing in Three Seasons: 5,259 in 1980-82 
Most Games Gaining 100 Yards or More In One Season: 11 in 1981 (tied with 4 
others) · 
Most Games Gaining 200 Yards or More by a Freshman: 4 in 1980 
Average Yards per Game by a Freshman: 146.9 in 1980 
Most Carries in Three Seasons: 994 in 1980-82 
Most All-Purpose Yards Gained by a Freshman: 1,805 in 1980 (1616 rush, 70 rec, 
119 KO ret) 
Most Seasons Gaining 1,500 Yards or More: 3 in 1980, 1981, 1982 
Most All-Purpose Yards in Three Seasons: 5,749 in 1980-82 (5,259 rush, 243 rec, 
247 KO ret) 
6 Public reactions to the signing was so strong that Senator Arlen Specter introduced a 
bill, the Collegiate Student Athlete Protection Act of 1983, Senate Bill 610. U.S.A. Today, 
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the New Jersey Generals of the newly organized United States 
Football League (USFL).7 This contract, estimated to bring 
Walker between $3.9 million8 and $16.5 million9 for the three year 
period, made him the highest paid player in the history of profes-
sional football. 10 By this signing Walker also became the first col-
lege undergraduate in modern times to play professional football in 
the United States.11 
For more than fifty years, the National Football League (NFL) 
has refused to employ college undergraduates.12 Under NFL rules, 
the only players eligible to be drafted are those who will have grad-
uated by the following September 1st, or those who have either 
exhausted their college football eligibility or who first entered col-
lege at least five years earlierP 
Mar. 1, 1983, at 1C. This legislation would have exempted the draft eligibility rules from the 
antitrust laws. Id. However, representatives from the sponsoring Senator's office state that 
the bill will not be reported out of Committee. Telephone interview with Steve Johnson 
(Sept. 8, 1983) (an aide to Senator Specter). 
7 Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1983, at AI, col. I. 
• Zimmerman, A New Round of Star Wars?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 7, I983, at 41. 
9 Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1983, at AI, col. 1. Some reports had Walker earning as 
much as $I6.5 million for the three-year period. See THE SPORTING NEws, Mar. 7, I983, at 
53; Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 41. 
10 Washington Post, Feb. 24, I983, at A27, col. I. The largest annual salary prior to 
Walker's signing was $806,668 paid to O.J. Simpson in his final year of playing. Id. 
11 U.S.A. Today, Feb. 25, I983, at IC, col. 4. In 1925, Harold (Red) Grange left the 
University of Illinois after the final game of his senior year to sign with the Chicago Bears of 
the newly organized NFL, Detroit Free Press, Feb. 27, I983, at IF, col. 3. In 1974, Clarence 
Reece left the University of Southern California following his sophomore season and played 
in the Canadian Football League. In I975, he signed a contract with the Houston Oilers of 
the NFL. The contract was disapproved by NFL Commissioner Rozelle on the grounds that 
Reece had not satisfied the league's eligibility requirements. Reece, alleging that the eligibil-
ity rules constituted an illegal group boycott sued the NFL. Upon assurances that no league 
team had encouraged Reece to leave college, the Commissioner rescinded his disapproval of 
Reece's contract. L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAw 466 n.3 (I977). In 198I, it was 
reported that Walker had been offered $I,500,000 to $2,000,000 to sign a three-year contract 
with the Montreal Alouettes of the Canadian Football League. Smith, supra note I, at 30-
31. See also L. SMITH & L. GRIZZARD, supra note I, at 192. This offer apparently prompted 
alumni of the University to attempt to start an insurance agency in Walker's name. The 
plan was vetoed by the NCAA. Id. 
12 Washington Post, Feb. 24, I983, A27, col. 4. 
13 NFL CoNST. AND BY-LAws art. XII, § 12.I; art. XIV, § I4.2 (1976). The NFL Consti-
tution and By-Laws provide in art. XIV, § 14.2: 
The only players eligible to be selected in any Selection Meeting shall be those 
players who fulfill the eligibility standards prescribed in Article XII, § I2.I of the 
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The USFL eligibility rule, like that of the NFL, excludes college 
undergraduates.14 Spokespersons for the new league maintain that 
Walker's signing was a "special" circumstance15 and that the 
league will abide by its eligibility rule when faced with a similar 
situation in the future.16 The NFL steadfastly refused to alter its 
Constitution and By-Laws of the League. 
Article XII, § 12.1(A) provides: 
No person shall be eligible to play or be selected as a player unless (1) all college 
football eligibility of such player has expired, or (2) at least five (5) years shall 
have elapsed since the player first entered or attended a recognized junior college, 
college, or university, or (3) such player receives a diploma from a recognized col-
lege or university prior to September 1st of the next football season of the League. 
" N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1983, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1983, at A22, col. 1.; 
Detroit Free Press, Jan. 2, 1983, at 2C, col. 1. 
On February 28, 1984, the USFL rule was declared to be a group boycott and thus a per 
se violation of section one of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). Boris v. USFL, No. CU 83-
4980 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984). The USFL advanced the following arguments in support of 
its rule: (1) the eligibility rule promotes on-field competitive balance among USFL teams; 
(2) very few college athletes are physically, mentally, or emotionally mature enough for pro· 
fessional football; (3) abolition of the rule would not benefit the college athlete; ( 4) the rule 
promotes the concept of the importance of a college education; (5) the rule promotes the 
efficient operation of the USFL by strengthening the sport at the college level; (6) the rule is 
not inflexible; and (7) the rule is necessary for competitive reasons. In rejecting the League 
argument, the court found that although the above reasons might have merit, the principal 
reason for the rule was to respond to the demands made by college coaches to retain the 
rule, thus insuring better access to college campuses. Id. 
15 N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1983, at A1, col. 1. Officials of the USFL have stated that per-
mission to sign Walker was granted to the Generals because they had been advised that the 
draft eligibility rule was not legally defensible. Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1983, at A27, col. 
2; The Sporting News, Mar. 7, 1983, at 53; U.S.A. Today, Feb. 24, 1983, at lC. 
On March 3, 1984, Marcus Dupree signed with New Orleans Breakers of the USFL. The 
Sporting News, Mar. 12, 1984, at 27, col. 1. 
•• N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1983, at Al, col. 1, B20, col. 3.; Detroit Free Press, Mar. 5, 1983, 
at 2D, col. 1; The Chronicle of Higher Education, Mar. 9, 1983, at 2D, col. 1. Other college 
undergraduate football players currently considered to be of interest to professional teams 
but excluded from the draft include: Dalton Hilliard, Louisiana State University; Ricky 
Hunley, University of Arizona; Ken Jackson, Pennsylvania State University; Bill Fralic, 
University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A. Today, Feb. 24, 1983, at 1C, col. 2. One former college 
player, Bob Boris, has sued the USFL challenging its draft eligibility rule. Boris v. USFL, 
No. CU 83-4980 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984); see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1983, at A17, col. 6. 
Marcus Dupree, an undergraduate most prominently mentioned as one who, like Walker, 
could earn several hundreds of thousands of dollars annually if permitted to play profes-
sionally has said, "I don't really like school. College isn't for everybody and I guess it's just 
not for me." Looney, New Philadelphia Story, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 20, 1983, at 39. 
This article demonstrates that the draft eligibility rules, by precluding employment for col-
lege undergraduates, violate the antitrust laws. 
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rule in the Walker case17 and has pledged to continue to exclude 
all other college undergraduates.18 Since undergraduate college 
football players such as Walker are, therefore, excluded from the 
draft and subsequent employment, 19 they must live with the ever-
present danger of incurring a disabling injury that would preclude 
a professional career.20 It has been said of the position Walker 
plays that, "[r]unning back, after all, is just a Faustian bargain: 
The devil only gives you so many years before he demands your 
knee cartilage."21 The specter of injury to Walker was apparent. 
Before Walker became a professional, an NFL scout declared, "If 
the shoulder injury doesn't become chronic . . . he stands to be-
come the richest rookie in the history of the NFL."22 
17 During negotiations prior to Walker's signing, the NFL was given the opportunity to 
abandon its rule and sign Walker. They refused this opportunity. The Sporting News, Mar. 
7, 1983, at 53; Denver Post, Feb. 28, 1983, at 10C, col. 1; Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1983, at 
27A. 
18 Detroit Free Press, Mar. 25, 1983, at 8 D, col. 5; Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 44; 
U.S.A. Today, Feb. 24, 1983, at 3C. 
19 Such employment might bring amateur athletes sorely needed remuneration. Prior to 
Walker's signing, his family had not been financially well-heeled. Herschel is the fifth of 
seven children of Willis and Christine Walker of Wrightsville, Georgia (population 2,100). 
When Herschel was born, his mother had to travel to Dublin-11 miles away-since 
Wrightsville had no hospital or even a small clinic. For most of his life, Willis Walker 
worked on a farm for $20 per week while Christine earned $10 per week. After the seventh 
child was born, Mr. Walker gave up farming for work at a kaolin (chalk) manufacturing 
plant while Mrs. Walker took a job at a garment factory. Smith, supra note 1, at 32. 
Had Walker signed with the Canadian Football League, he could have shifted to the Na-
tional Football League at age 22 when most players begin their professional careers and 
"stirred the grandest scramble in the history of human flesh." Smith, supra note 1, at 30. 
Walker did not want to go to Canada to ply his trade. "I don't think you should have to go 
outside your country to make a living anyway," he said. Id. 
20 In the 1981 Sugar Bowl game against Notre Dame, Walker was badly injured on his 
second carry. His left shoulder "subluxated" and he had to leave the game. It- was the kind 
of injury that normally takes a player out of competition for three weeks. Kirkpatrick, supra 
note 1, at 45. Walker, however, returned to the game on Georgia's next series of plays. No 
runner had gained more than one hundred yards on Notre Dame all season. Walker was 
directed not to try to catch a pass, not to stiff-arm an opponent, and to hold the ball only 
with his right hand. Even though he was severely injured, Walker carried the ball thirty 
times, gained one hundred fifty yards and scored two touchdowns to gain the 17-10 victory, 
the Most Valuable Player award and the National Championship for his team. Id. 
21 Smith, supra note 1, at 30. 
•• Id. at 34. The prospect of injury was such that before the 1981 season, Walker's 
father planned to take out a loan of $6,000 to $8,000 to secure a one-year, 8500,000 policy 
insuring against injury. Id. at 32. 
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The NFL's eligibility rule dates from the 1920's.23 At one time, 
the League stated that the rule was adopted to provide competitive 
balance.24 Today it appears to be more of a mechanism for main-
taining a de facto farm system for the League that assures well-
seasoned players for the draft. 25 By these rules the owners of the 
clubs have combined and conspired to restrain competition for 
Walker's services in flagrant violation of the antitrust laws. The 
obvious effect of the strictures is to deny other similarly situated 
college stars the opportunity to earn a livelihood in their chosen 
profession. The eligibility rule is the most restrictive rule of its 
type in professional sports and is devoid of legally cognizable 
justification. 
This article's purpose is to examine the lawfulness of profes-
sional football's draft eligibility rules under the antitrust laws. Pre-
liminary, however, it must be observed that the NFL's draft eligi-
bility rule, unlike the rule of the USFL,26 has been made part of 
the collective bargaining contract between the owners and the 
players' union.27 In order to accommodate goals which are central 
to national labor policy, the labor exemption to the antitrust laws28 
accords immunity to many collectively bargained terms, which 
would violate the antitrust laws if unilaterally imposed by employ-
ers. Initially then, it must be determined whether agreement by 
labor and management over the draft eligibility rule exempts it 
23 Underwood, Does Herschel Have Georgia on His Mind?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 
1, 1982, at 24. 
2
• During the 1960's, the better NFL clubs drafted college players who, although not 
playing for their college teams in a given year, retained eligibility to play in a future year 
(so-called "red shirts") enabling dominant teams to stockpile future players. As a result, the 
League banned the drafting of red shirted college players until their college careers were 
actually completed. See Rights of Professional Athletes: Hearings on H.R. 2355 and H.R. 
694 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1975) (testimony of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, Na-
tional Football League). 
2
" UnderWood, supra note 23, at 24. 
28 Players in the USFL are not, as yet, represented by a collective bargaining represen-
tative. Because no collective bargaining has taken place over the draft eligibility rule in the 
USFL, the article's analysis pertaining to the labor exemption to the antitrust laws would 
not apply in a challenge to the draft eligibility rule in that league. 
27 See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
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from antitrust interdiction under the labor exemption. 
If the exemption is applicable, no further inquiry into the re-
straints imposed by the rule is warranted.29 Determining that the 
labor exemption does not immunize the NFL's draft eligibility rule 
under these circumstances, this article next analyzes the rules of 
both leagues under substantive antitrust principles. This analysis 
leads to the conclusion that the draft eligibility rules present a 
clear violation of the antitrust laws and, if challenged by a college 
undergraduate football player, should be struck down as illegal. 
II. APPLICATION OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION TO THE LEAGUE'S 
RuLE 
There's some authority in labor and antitrust law that cer-
tainly gives the union the right to bargain about the rights of 
potential employees. 30 
National labor policy seeks to promote collective bargaining to 
resolve important employer and employee concerns.31 Because 
many agreements between labor and management also serve to re-
strain competition within the omnibus language of the Sherman 
Act,32 a judicially created exemption-the so-called labor exemp-
tion-has been fashioned. The labor exemption attempts to accom-
modate inherent conflicts between national labor and antitrust pol-
icy and to protect labor-management agreements over issues of 
central importance to labor from antitrust interdiction. 33 
As previously mentioned, the NFL's draft eligibility rule has 
been made a part of the collective bargaining contract between the 
NFL owners and the players' union.34 Additionally, the issue of po-
•• J. WEISTART & c. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 525 (1979). 
30 Underwood, supra note 23, at 24 (quoting Professor Paul Weiler, Harvard Law 
School, commenting on the draft eligibility rule). 
31 See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. 
•• The 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFL and the National Foot-
ball League Players Association (NFLP A) states in relevant part: 
Any provisions of the ... N.F.L. Constitution and Bylaws ... which are not su-
perseded by this Agreement, will remain in full force and effect for the continued 
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tential employees' access to employment opportunities is, under 
some circumstances, a subject of substantial importance to unions 
and may constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining under the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).35 Thus, a provocative and 
important argument can be made that those national policies 
which promote collective bargaining and protect certain union ac-
tivities also serve to immunize this contractual term from antitrust 
scrutiny. 
The labor exemption to the antitrust laws has been a significant 
issue in virtually all modern antitrust challenges to player restraint 
systems.36 Moreover, it has been invoked in recent cases by sports 
leagues to successfully parry antitrust attacks by players on the 
various player restraint schemes. 37 Exploration of the labor exemp-
tion defense is critical because if the exemption is available to the 
league in this situation, inquiry into the economic justifications for 
the restraint or the extent of the harm suffered by undergraduate 
duration of this Agreement and, where app_licable, all players, clubs, the 
N.F.L.P.A., the N.F.L., and the Management Council will be bound thereby. 
NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. I, § 2 (Mar. 1, 1977). 
30 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1973). Section 158(d) of the Act defines collective bargaining as 
"[t]he performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the 
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours 
and other terms and conditions of employment." Id. § 158(d). Section 159(a) also declares 
that the union shall be the employees' exclusive representative "in respect to rates of pay, 
wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment." Id. § 159(a). The phrase 
"wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment," then, constitutes the issues 
about which the duty to bargain applies and matters which fall within this definition are 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. Beyond these areas, in so-called permissive subjects of 
bargaining, either party may refuse to negotiate and may implement decisions unilaterally. 
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
36 See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part & 
rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (football); Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 
(D. Minn. 1975), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 
434 U.S. 801 (1977) (football); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 
556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977) (basketball); Kapp. v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), 
af/'d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979) (football); Boston Profl 
Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 
1972) (hockey); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 
351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey). 
37 Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 
460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). 
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players becomes unnecessary. 38 Furthermore, the invocation of the 
labor exemption in this situation raises difficult questions about 
the nature and scope of the doctrine. Thus an in-depth analysis of 
this exemption is necessary for a full appreciation of the thesis of 
this article. 39 
A. Overview of the Labor Exemption 
The primary purpose of antitrust legislation is to promote free-
dom of competition in the marketplace.40 On the other hand, the 
primary purpose of labor legislation, particularly as embodied in 
the National Labor Relations Act/1 is to promote collective bar-
gaining and to protect certain union or concerted employee activi-
ties.42 Unions, however, are by their nature and purpose anticom-
38 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
39 There has been a wealth of scholarship addressing the doctrine of the labor exemp-
tion of the antitrust laws. The focus of this article is upon the application of the doctrine to 
negotiated player restraint systems in professional sports generally and the NFL draft eligi-
bility rule particularly. A partial list of important writings on the doctrine includes: Boudin, 
The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes (pts. 1 & 2), 39 CoLUM. L. REv. 1283 (1939), 40 
CoLUl\1. L. REv. 14 (1940); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 
104 U. PA. L. REv. 252 (1955); Handler & Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust 
Laws: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUIII. L. REv. 459 (1981); Meltzer, 
Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 659 (1965); 
St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REv. 603 
(1976); Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and Allen Bradley, 13 
LAB. L.J. 957 (1962); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of 
Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963). 
40 See infra note 180. See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) 
("The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed 
at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade."); Allen Bradley Co. v. 
Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945) ("[Antitrust policy] ... seeks to preserve a com-
petitive business economy .... "); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 14 
(1977) ("The purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition and to inhibit monop-
oly and restraints upon freedom of trade in all sectors of the economy to which these laws 
apply."). See also Fried & Crabtree, Labor, 33 ANTITRUST L.J. 38 (1967). 
41 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-169. 
42 Congress' intent to protect unions and encourage collective bargaining is strongly 
established in the following excerpt from the preamble to the Act: 
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of 
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging 
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise 
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms 
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petitive.43 As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized, a central purpose of the labor movement is to reduce 
competition among employees regarding wages and conditions of 
employm,ent.44 The goal of eliminating competition among individ-
ual workers for wages and other employment terms is achieved by 
individual employees relinquishing their prior right to individually 
pursue an employment contract. The union becomes the exclusive 
representative of all employees on the assumption that, through 
the pooling of strength and the threat of strikes and other con-
certed activity, greater benefits for employees as a group will be 
exacted. Inevitably, this process produces standardization of em-
ployment terms for particular classes of employees.45 As a matter 
of course, unions seek agreements with employers that establish 
uniform terms and that consequently limit the opportunity of any 
individual employee to sell his services on the most favorable 
terms.46 Some employees will be better off as a result, while for 
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
29 U.S.C. § 151. The NLRA further provides that employees have the "right to self-organi-
zation, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " Id. § 157. 
•• "In short, unionization, collective bargaining and standardization of wages and work-
ing conditions are inherently inconsistent with many of the assumptions at the heart of 
anti-trust policy." A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 872 
(9th ed. 1981). "From the outset, the difficulty in applying the antitrust concept to organ-
ized labor has been that the two are intrinsically incompatible. The antitrust laws are 
designed to promote competition, and unions, avowedly and unabashedly, are designed to 
limit it." St. Antoine, supra note 39, at 604 . 
.. "This Court has recognized that a legitimate aim of any national labor organization 
is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a consequence of such union activity 
may be to eliminate competition based on differences in such standards." UMW v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 651, 666 (1965). 
•• Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of 
Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1971). 
•• It is a fundamental tenet of labor law that the rights of an individual must yield to 
those of the group. The Supreme Court has observed: 
But it is urged that some employees may lose by the collective agreement, that an 
individual workman may sometimes have, or be capable of getting, better terms 
than those obtainable by the group .... We find the mere possibility that such 
agreements might be made no ground for holding generally that individual con-
tracts may survive or surmount collective ones. The practice and philosophy of 
collective bargaining iooks with suspicion on such individual advantages. 
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944). See also H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE 
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other employees, such standardization will impair their ability to 
secure a better individual bargain.47 Examples of union objectives 
with obvious anticompetitive effects include uniform wage rates, 
seniority systems, and hiring halls. A standard wage rate, present 
in most industries with industry-wide union contracts other than 
the sports industry, results in a competitive disadvantage for more 
highly skilled workers who could command a wage greater than the 
standard rate. Seniority systems and hiring halls have a similar ef-
fect upon less senior but more highly skilled employees. If unions, 
whose proper objectives are inherently anticompetitive, are to be 
accepted and indeed protected, restrictions on the free operation of 
the labor market must be tolerated.48 
Agreements between employers and unions, then, are frequently 
"combinations in restraint of trade" within the literal language of 
the Sherman Act.49 Nevertheless, case precedent firmly establishes 
that agreements regarding matters such as uniform wage rates, se-
niority systems, and hiring halls are entirely permissible. 50 Indeed, 
in view of the fact that these matters normally constitute 
mandatory subjects of bargaining,51 they are clearly matters about 
which national labor policy encourages agreement. 
The effort to accommodate these two important national policies 
LEGAL PROCESS 130 (1968); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 29, at 549. 
•• Jacobs & Winter, supra note 45, at 9-10; J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 29, at 
562. 
•• "We have long since concluded that the value of having unions in our society makes 
them worth promoting. Having made that judgment, we must be prepared to abide some of 
the consequences." St. Antoine, supra note 39, at 631. 
•• It is clear, however, that Congress' primary purpose in enacting the Sherman Act was 
to deal with business monopolies and restrictive trade practices, not trade union activities. 
Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940). Indeed, a genuine question exists as to 
whether Congress intended the Act to apply to groups of employees at all. "On the basis of 
the Congressional debates . . . it is believed that no valid evidences can be found in the 
records of the legislative proceedings that Congress intended the Anti-trust Act to apply to 
labor organizations." E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 51 (1930). See also Boudin 
(pt. 1), supra note 39, at 1285-87. 
00 See, e.g., UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 651, 665-66 (1965). 
01 See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 389-90, 405, 407-09 (C. Morris ed. 1971); United 
States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112 (1951), modified, 206 F.2d 410 (1953) (seniority sys-
tems as mandatory subjects of bargaining); Houston Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 143 
N.L.R.B. 409 (1963), enforced, 349 F.2d 449, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966) (hiring halls 
as mandatory subjects of bargaining). 
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has been left largely to the courts. 52 As the Supreme Court has 
crisply stated: 
[W]e have two declared congressional policies which it is our 
responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a 
competitive business economy; the other to preserve the 
rights of labor to organize to better its conditions through the 
agency of collective bargaining. We must determine here how 
far Congress intended activities under one of these policies to 
neutralize the results envisioned by the other.53 
The Court has addressed the proper accommodation of these 
policies on several occasions. Although the specific contours of the 
labor exemption remain uncertain, existing Supreme Court prece-
dent54 and lower court application of the labor exemption doctrine 
in cases challenging other aspects of the employment relationship, 
including the "reserve" systems in professional sports,55 clearly 
show that the interests protected by the draft eligibility rule are 
far removed from those which national labor policy clothes with 
immunity. 
Courts56 and commentators57 have urged various formulations 
•• Judicial review of congressional efforts to create an antitrust exemption for labor has 
limited the statutory exemption to specific unilateral union activities including secondary 
picketing and boycotts. E.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-37 (1941); Con-
nell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975); Handler 
& Zifchak, supra note 39, at 470. Negotiated agreements between unions and employers, 
therefore, are not subject to the statutory exemption. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 651, 
662 (1965). As early as 1941, however, the Supreme Court recognized in Hutcheson that 
accommodating antitrust and labor policy required that some labor-management agree-
ments be accorded a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 
at 233-37; see also Connell, 421 U.S. at 622-23. As Justice Goldberg observed, to do other-
wise would permit unions and employers to conduct industrial warfare but prohibit a peace-
ful resolution to their dispute. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 
U.S. 676, 712 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
•• Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945). 
•• See infra notes 82-93, 118-21, and accompanying text. 
•• See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. · 
•• See, e.g., UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 672 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); 
Local189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 697 (1965) (Goldberg, 
J., concurring). Justices Harlan and Stewart joined Justice Goldberg in Pennington and 
Jewel Tea. Under these Justices' view, the labor exemption should automatically immunize 
any labor-management agreement governing mandatory subjects of bargaining. Jewel Tea, 
381 U.S. at 697-725. 
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for reconciling national labor and antitrust policy in order to deter-
mine whether any given labor-management agreement should be 
immunized. Any such reconciliation, however, inevitably entails a 
balancing of the agreement's impact on competition against the 
importance of the employee interests at stake.58 Under this 
calculus, the anticompetitive effects of the draft eligibility rule out-
weigh any countervailing employee interests. That is, the wholesale 
extinction of employment opportunities for an entire class of pro-
spective employees occasioned by the draft eligibility rule substan-
tially burdens competition59 without advancing any important in-
terest of active football players as employees. 
B. Role of the Labor Exemption in Sports Litigation 
During the decade of the 1970's, traditional player restraints 
such as the draft, 60 reserve clauses, 61 and free agent indemnity ar-
rangements62 were successfully challenged by disaffected players in 
•• Professor Sovern, for example, has urged that labor abuses be addressed not through 
Sherman Act application but "within the framework of our labor legislation." Sovern, supra 
note 39, at 963. Professor Winter has argued in favor of a legislative approach to regulating 
abuses arising from labor-management agreements. Winter, supra note 39, at 66-73. Profes-
sor Handler and William Zifchak have urged a similar approach. Handler & Zifchak, supra 
note 39 at 513-15. 
•• As Professor Meltzer has observed, "[w]hether any particular demand is exempt de-
pends on weighing the interest in competition against the competing interests of the em-
ployees." Meltzer, supra note 39, at 724. Justice White, in his opinion in Jewel Tea, also 
remarked: "The crucial determinant is not the form of agreement . . . but its relative im-
pact on the product market and the interests of union members." 381 U.S. at 690 n.5. 
•• See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text. 
60 The draft is the mechanism by which entering players are allocated to teams, usually 
in reverse order of the selecting team's standing the prior year. The most hotly contested 
element of the draft has been the exclusive, perpetual right of the drafting team to negotiate 
for the drafted player's services. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 
(D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Robertson v. 
NBA Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977). See also 
Pierce, Organized Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 566, 
603 (1958); Note, The Battle of the Superstars: Player Restraints in Professional Team 
Sports, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 669, 670 (1980). 
61 Reserve systems were characterized by a perpetual right in the employing club to 
renew the contract of the player and were enforced through no-tampering agreements. J. 
WEISTART & C. LowELL, supra note 29, at 505-06. See Rottenberg, The Baseball Players' 
Labor Market, 64 J. PoL. EcoN. 242, 245 (1956) (blacklisting arrangement). 
62 Indemnity arrangements among teams insure that if a player leaves a club which 
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all professional sports except baseball. 63 These players argued that 
such rules impermissibly operated to restrain their ability to mar-
ket their services freely. 64 In each case, the labor exemption was 
raised as a defense. The various leagues took the position that the 
putative restraint was the product of agreement between the em-
ployers, negotiating on a multi-employer basis, and the player as-
sociation, negotiating as representative of all players. As a result, 
the leagues urged, the collectively bargained agreement should be 
shielded from subsequent attack by players whose representative 
has assented to the arrangement under scrutiny. 65 
employs him to play for another team within the league, then the original team will be 
compensated in the form of a player, draft rights, or money. League by-laws frequently 
provide that if the former team and the acquiring team cannot agree on the type or amount 
of compensation the former team should receive, then the determination would be made by 
the league commissioner. In essence, the compensation is a forced trade. J. WEISTART & C. 
LowELL, supra note 29, at 502-03. These arrangements have produced considerable litiga-
tion. For a discussion of the operation of indemnity arrangements, see Mackey v. NFL, 407 
F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), 
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), 
aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586 
F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). In these cases, players claimed 
that the forced compensation schemes operated to discourage prospective employing club 
owners from hiring available players and, therefore, restrained player mobility. See J. WEIS-
TART & C. LOWELL, supra note 29, at 503. 
•• Since Justice Holmes' decision in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National 
League of Prof'! Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), baseball, alone among professional 
sports, has operated under a judicially created exemption from the antitrust laws. This ex-
emption has engendered a great deal of comment and criticism. See, e.g., L. SoBEL, supra 
note 11, at 66-72; Berry & Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of Players, 
Owners, Brawls and Strikes, 31 CAs·E W. REs. L. REv. 685, 729-30 & n.129 (1981); Comment, 
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. 
REv. 737 (1971); Comment, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team 
Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARV. L. REv. 418 (1967). See also H.R. REP. No. 2002, 
82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) . 
.. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd in part & rev'd in 
part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (football); Smith v. 
Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 593 
F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (football); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(basketball), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (basketball); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. 
v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey); McCourt v. 
California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 
1979) (hockey). 
•• This argument was presaged by a 1971 Yale Law Journal article by Michael Jacobs 
and Professor Ralph Winter. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 45. The authors argued that 
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Although the argument failed in Flood v. Kuhn66 for reasons 
other than because of the labor exemption, 67 the various leagues 
sought to utilize the defense in the tide of litigation that fol-
lowed. 68 Eventually a test emerged for the applicability of the la-
bor exemption in cases challenging player restraints incorporated 
either directly or by reference into collective bargaining agree-
ments. The standard was first set forth by the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Mackey v. National Football League.69 In 
Mackey, a group of active and retired NFL players argued that the 
League's free agent indemnity system, known as the Rozelle Rule, 
operated to restrain players' ability to market their services 
freely.70 The NFL defended on the ground that the agreement was 
part of the collective bargaining contract71 and that proper accom-
certiorari had been improvidently granted in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Curt 
Flood had been traded by the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies without con-
sultation and against his wishes. Major League Rule #9 stated that: "Upon receipt of writ-
ten notice of such assignment" the player is "bound to serve the assignee." In paragraph 
6(a) of his Uniform Player Contract, Flood had agreed that he could be so assigned. 
Flood's first and most important cause of action complained that the reserve system vio-
lated the Sherman Act. Jacobs and Winter, however, argued that: 
For years the impact of antitrust principles on the arrangements allocating players 
among teams in professional sports has been hotly disputed. Now recent events 
seem to have brought this issue to a head. A malaise among good athletes like 
Curt Flood has increased the tempo of litigation .... We enter this crowded 
arena not to solve the antitrust dilemma, but to put it to rest. For, in the form in 
which it is generally debated, it is an issue whose time has come and gone, an 
issue which has suffered that modern fate worse than death: irrelevancy. 
Jacobs & Winte1·, supra note 45, at 1. 
66 407 u.s. 258 (1972). 
67 The Court acknowledged in Flood that the narrow definition of interstate commerce 
adhered to in Federal Baseball had expanded so much in the intervening years that any 
exemption could no longer rest upon a finding that the baseball industry was not engaged in 
interstate commerce. The Court, however, refused to find baseball within the antitrust stric-
tures, reasoning that Congress had failed to remove the exemption in the fifty years since 
the Federal Baseball decision. 407 U.S. at 285. The decision has been widely criticized. See 
supra note 63. 
68 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
69 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
70 I d. The players also claimed that the draft, the standard player contract, the option 
clause and the no-tampering agreement constituted impermissible anticompetitive practices 
of the defendants. Id. at 609. 
71 The 1968 contract between the player's association and the National Football League 
incorporated by reference the NFL constitution and by-laws of which the Rozelle Rule was 
a part. The 1970 agreement, though not referring to the rule directly, did require that all 
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modation of federal labor and antitrust policy required that the 
agreement be deemed immune from antitrust interdiction.72 The 
court concluded that when evaluated under the rule of reason,73 
the indemnity rule could not be sustained.74 More importantly, for 
the present purposes, the court also rejected the League's labor ex-
emption defense.75 In the court's view, the labor exemption would 
be available to the employer only if each element of the following 
three-prong test were met:76 
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may po-
tentially be given preeminence over the antitrust laws where 
the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the 
collective bargaining relationship. 
Second, federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to 
prevail only where the agreement sought to be exempted con-
cerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 
Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is fur-
thered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws 
only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the prod-
uct of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.77 
players sign the standard player contract. That contract, in turn, provided that the player 
agreed to comply with and be bound by the league constitution and by-laws. Further, repre-
sentatives of the parties testified that it was their understanding that the Rozelle Rule 
would remain in effect during the term of the 1970 agreement. 
72 543 F.2d at 612. 
•• See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. 
" 543 F.2d at 620-22. The district court had found the rule unlawful as a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. As to this point, the court of appeals reversed the lower court. !d. 
at 623. 
•• 543 F.2d at 615. The appeal of this case was the first time a federal court of appeals 
considered the immunity issue in the context of professional league sports. J. WEISTART & C. 
LowELL, supra note 29, at 576. 
•• In applying this test, the court of appeals in Mackey specifically _rejected a finding by 
the district court that the labor "exemption extends only to labor or union activities and not 
to the activities of employers." 543 F.2d at 612 (discussing the district court's finding at 407 
F. Supp. at 1008). 
" 543 F.2d at 614-15 (citations omitted). In Mackey, the court concluded that the in-
demnity arrangement affected only the parties to·the agreement, and that although it was 
technically an arrangement among owners, it operated to restrict a player's mobility and 
depressed player's salaries. Id. at 618-19. Accordingly, the court concluded that the rule was 
intimately related to wages and thus constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining under 
the NLRA. I d. at 615. It was on the third prong of the test that the NFL's defense faltered. 
The appellate court found that substantial evidence supported the lower court's finding that 
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The application of the labor exemption to a collectively bar-
gained indemnity system was most recently treated in McCourt v. 
California Sports, Inc.78 The focus of this lawsuit was, once again, 
an "equalization" or free agent indemnity rule included in the col-
lective bargaining contract between the National Hockey League 
and the player association. 79 Plaintiff hockey player had been as-
signed, against his wishes, to another team as part of a trade. He 
challenged the indemnity rule under the antitrust laws. Again, the 
League argued that the labor exemption insulated its negotiated 
system from antitrust application. The Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit found for the defendant League and, in so doing, spe-
cifically approved of and applied the standard for immunity set 
forth by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey.80 
Because the Eighth Circuit standard has been accepted by ap-
pellate courts and because its application has been favorably re-
ceived by commentators,81 it is the logical starting point for discus-
sion of the application of the labor exemption to the NFL's draft 
there had not been "bona-fide arm's-length bargaining over the Rozelle Rule" and that the 
simple acceptance of the rule by the union did not serve to immunize it. Id. at 616. 
18 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). 
19 460 F. Supp. at 906. This rule was similar to the Rozelle Rule but provided that the 
decision regarding compensation was to be made by an independent arbitrator and not by 
the commissioner. Like the NFL's four-year rule, the NHL's indemnity rule was contained 
in a league by-law that had been incorporated by reference into the standard player con-
tract which was signed by the player and approved by the Players' Association. 
80 600 F.2d at 1198. As in Mackey, the court concluded that the restraint imposed by 
the indemnity arrangement affected primarily the parties to the agreement, constituted a 
mandatory subject of bargaining and, unlike Mackey, was a product of arm's-length bar-
gaining. In this case, the Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's finding that no arm's-
length bargaining had occurred because there had been no movement by the owners on that 
issue, and stated: 
[T]he trial court failed to recognize the well-established principle that nothing in 
the labor law compels either party negotiating over mandatory subjects of collec-
tive bargaining to yield on its initial bargaining position. Good faith bargaining is 
all that is required. That the position of one party on an issue prevails unchanged 
does not mandate the conclusion that there was no collective bargaining over the 
issue. 
Id. at 1200. 
81 See, e.g., J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 29, at 582. Note, Labor Exemption to 
the Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Anticompetitive Provision Devised by an Employer 
Group in its Own Interest: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C.L. REv. 680, 681 
(1980). 
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eligibility rule. Examination of the origins and limitations of each 
element of the Mackey-McCourt test is necessary because the con-
tours of the labor exemption are vague rather than comprehensive. 
This vagueness makes a mechanical application of the aforemen-
tioned test improper. 
Since the discussion ranges widely, however, it is appropriate to 
initially set forth the conclusions that will be reached. Supreme 
Court treatment of the labor exemption and basic principles of la-
bor law make the elements of the Mackey-McCourt test, with limi-
tations to be discussed later in this article, appropriate guidelines 
for the application of the exemption. In sum, the Mackey and Mc-
Court formulations provide a shorthand method for striking the 
balance between the importance of the subject matter to employee 
interests and its anticompetitive effects. 
1. The Restraint on Trade Brought About by the Draft Eligi-
bility Rule Does Not Primarily Affect Only Parties to the Collec-
tive Bargaining Relationship 
The first prong of the Mackey-McCourt standard mandates that 
the impact of the practice under scrutiny fall primarily on the con-
tracting parties before agreement on the matter will come within 
the labor exemption. The origin of this requirement can be found 
in United States Supreme Court precedent, particularly in UMW 
v. Pennington,82 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,83 and Con-
nell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100.84 In 
each of these cases, the Supreme Court refused to grant antitrust 
immunity to agreements between employers and unions even 
though the agreement concerned wages or some other matter of 
mandatory bargaining and was of central concern to employees 
and unions. 
In Pennington, the union allegedly had agreed with major coal 
mine operators not to oppose rapid mechanization in their opera-
tions. The employer was to compensate the union for the resultant 
82 381 u.s. 657 (1965). 
83 325 u.s. 797 (1945) . 
.. 421 u.s. 616 (1975). 
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reduction in the labor force by an increase in employees' wages. 
The union also promised the large companies to impose the in-
creased wage scale on smaller competing companies irrespective of 
the ability of those companies to meet the greater wage demand. 
The Court concluded that this agreement, although directly con-
cerning wages of employees and thus a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining, was not within the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. 
The Court divided into three groups, each consisting of three Jus-
tices. The opinion of Justice White, designated as that of the 
Court, acknowledged that an agreement between a union and an 
employer regarding wages was of central concern to the union and, 
normally, would be exempt from antitrust application.85 The opin-
ion also recognized the right of the union to make uniform wage 
demands of employers, but only if undertaken individually and on 
its own initiative. The Pennington Court, nevertheless, held that: 
One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate com-
petitors from the industry and the union is liable with the 
employers if it becomes party to the conspiracy ... [t]he pol-
icy of the antitrust laws is clearly set against employer-union 
agreements seeking to prescribe labor standards outside the 
bargaining unit.86 
8
" 381 U.S. at 660. 
88 I d. at 665-68. It may be fairly argued that the objective of the agreement between the 
union and the employers in Pennington was the elimination of competition in the product 
market. Since the NFL's draft eligibility rule does not preclude potential teams from com-
peting with existing teams, but instead suppresses competition in a labor market, the 
League might argue that Pennington is inapposite in the instant matter. The distinction 
between the labor market and the product market, however, is not easily drawn. Many 
union activities, such as secondary boycotts, restraints on the use of new technology or re-
striction of supply through control of hours of work, touch upon both the product and the 
labor market. "The impact of wage costs on supply and price results in an inextricable con-
nection between the two markets. As a result, the general objectives of the Sherman Act, 
... can be frustrated by monopoly powers exerted solely in the labor market." B. MELTZER, 
LABOR LAW 515 (2d ed. 1977). See also Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). At the same time, the antitrust laws serve to protect access to employment opportu-
nities even if secondarily to protecting the product market. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 
F. Supp. 738, 744 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part & reu'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). Therefore, reliance on this product-labor distinction would be misplaced. Professor 
Leslie has flatly said, "Antitrust regulation of unions does not turn on a distinction between 
the product and labor markets, nor on differences between direct and indirect limitations." 
D. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 79 (Teacher's Manual1978). . 
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The defect in the arrangement in Pennington, then, was that the 
union bound itself with the major coal operators to impose de-
mands upon persons not party to the collective bargaining 
relationship. 
Support for this requirement may also be found in Allen Brad-
ley.87 There, in a complex series of agreements, electrical contrac-
tors in the New York City area agreed with the union to buy 
equipment only from manufacturers recognizing the local union. 
Electrical equipment manufacturers in turn agreed to limit their 
sales to contractors also recognizing the local union. The effect of 
this arrangement was a refusal to deal with nonsignitory electrical 
equipment manufacturers, such as the plaintiff. The agreement 
also excluded electrical contractors from competition for the New 
York City area business. The Court concluded that the labor ex-
emption would not save the obvious restraint on competition even 
though the union's purpose was to increase members' wages and 
employment opportunities: "[W]hen the unions participated with a 
combination of business men who had complete power to eliminate 
all competition among themselves and to prevent all competition 
from others, a situation was created not included within the ex-
emptions."88 This phrase was quoted and emphasized by the Court 
in Pennington and supports the position that an extra-unit focus 
by labor and management may remove an agreement from 
immunity.89 
Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Connell90 also prohib-
ited an extra-unit focus. In Connell, the union sought agreements 
from general contractors that they would select only firms that 
were signitory to collective bargaining contracts with the union as 
subcontractors. The union, however, disavowed any interest in or-
ganizing the employees of the general contractors. The effect of 
this arrangement was to preclude non-union subcontractors from 
87 325 u.s. 797 (1945). 
88 Id. at 809. 
89 See Meltzer, supra note 39, at 715-16; Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. 
L. REv. 1183 (1980); Weistart, Judicial Review of Labor Agreements: Lessons from the 
Sports Industry, 44 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 109, 112. 
90 421 u.s. 616 (1975). 
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competing for jobs. Consequently, firms which might offer impor-
tant price or quality advantages were precluded from marketing 
their services to the general contractor.91 The direct market re-
straint on strangers to the relationship was an important factor in 
the Court's conclusion that the labor exemption was unavailable, 
even though the goal of the union was to expand employment op-
portunities for its members. 
In each modern Supreme Court case refusing immunity to labor 
management agreements, then, an important factor has been that 
the primary effect of the contract was to restrain parties who were 
strangers to the collective bargaining relationship. The Court has 
found this fault in the agreements to be determinative, despite the 
recognition that the interest pursued by the union was of central 
importance to it and its members.92 At the same time, when the 
anticompetitive effect of an agreement has fallen primarily upon 
the parties to the collective bargaining relationship, the Court has 
been willing to extend the exemption even to matters of arguably 
less concern to the union. 93 Thus, it is understandable that the 
courts have looked closely at who is primarily affected by the re-
straints of a labor-management agreement and have limited the 
application of the labor exemption to those arrangements in which 
the restraint falls primarily on the parties to the relationship. 
While this requirement is helpful, it nonetheless constitutes an 
oversimplification. First, the line between internal and external ef-
fects is murky. Labor and management bargain and indeed are re-
quired to bargain upon demand over matters that frequently im-
pinge upon the interests of strangers to the collective bargaining 
relationship.94 For example, agreements limiting the employer's 
91 Id. at 625. 
•• "[A]ll of the cases in which a union agreement was found not to be exempt involved 
situations in which the extra-unit product market effects were the source of the objections 
raised." J. WEISTART & C. LowELL, supra note 29, at 563 (citation omitted). 
93 In Jewel Tea, part of the labor-management agreement concerned the marketing 
hours of the employer. At the same time, the effect of the agreement restrained only the 
parties to the relationship. Local189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 
676, 684-85 (1965). See St. Antoine, supra note 39, 622 n.90 (1976). 
•• See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text. "It is inevitable that labor and man-
agement are required to bargain over matters that impinge directly or indirectly on the 
interest of strangers to the bargaining relationship." Handler & Zifchak, supra note 39, at 
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ability to subcontract work or introduce labor-saving devices are 
sought by unions to preserve work for their members and fre-
quently constitute subjects of mandatory bargaining,95 but also 
may severely limit the opportunity of third-party firms to do busi-
ness with the contracting employer. Similarly, a most-favored-na-
tions clause,96 designed to protect an employer against competition 
from firms with lower labor costs, is also considered a mandatory 
subject of bargaining97 and ought to be accorded immunity even 
though such arrangements have obvious external effects and serve 
to limit competition.9s Finally, and most germane to this analysis, 
union hiring hall arrangements often serve to limit competition for 
employment.99 They, too, are mandatory subjects of bargaining.100 
504. 
•• Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (subcontracting of 
bargaining unit work a mandatory subject to bargaining); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. Oliver, 362 U.S. 605 (1960) (Oliver II) (amount of rent employer will pay independent 
truckers a mandatory subject of bargaining); NLRB v. Columbia Tribune Pub. Co., 495 F.2d 
1384 (8th Cir. 1974) (automation of employer's process a mandatory subject of bargaining). 
•• Most-favored-nation clauses, prevalent in the construction industry, require the 
union to give the employer the most favorable terms the union subsequently grants any 
other employer. See St. Antoine, supra note 39, at 610. 
97 Notwithstanding the language in UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 710 (1965), that 
a union may not "impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units", most-favored-
nation clauses are not only permissible, but also may constitute mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining. See, e.g., Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 
(1970) (most-favored-nation clauses are not per se invalid under Pennington); Dolly 
Madison Indus., 182 N.L.R.B. 1230 (1970). 
•• St. Antoine, supra note 39, at 611. See Hotel, Motel, Restaurant, Hi-Rise Employees 
& Bartenders Union Local 355, 245 N.L.R.B. 774 (1979). 
•• A collective bargaining contract may include a provision that establishes a union-
operated exclusive hiring hall. This hiring hall operates as the sole source of skilled laborers 
for the employer. Generally, the union hiring hall refers applicants on the basis of factors 
such as seniority, length of residence in the area and work experience in the trade. Hiring 
halls, therefore, can effectively limit competition for employment in their respective indus-
tries because these factors, rather than ability to perform the job, determine who actually 
gets hired. See, e.g., Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); Hous-
ton Chapter Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. NLRB, 143 N.L.R.B. 409, 416 (1963) (members Rog-
ers & Leedom, dissenting), enforced, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965). See also J. WEISTART & 
C. LowELL, supra note 29, at 562-63; Fenton, Union Hiring Halls Under the Taft-Hartley 
Act, 9 LAB. L.J. 505, 506 (1958); Jacobs & Winter, supra note 45, at 8. 
100 Houston Chapter, 143 N.L.R.B. 409. Both the NLRB and the Supreme Court have 
noted that although the exclusive hiring hall may encourage union membership, it has well 
served both management and labor, especially in the maritime field and in the building and 
construction industry where the employee is frequently a stranger to the area where the 
work is to be performed. See Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 
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Although such arrangements may have a dramatic impact on 
strangers to the collective bargaining relationship, the hiring hall 
can be accorded antitrust immunity. 
It is apparent that the internal-external distinction is not a 
wholly satisfactory one. Nevertheless, it can be said that those 
agreements that have as their primary purpose or effect the elimi-
nation of competition from strangers to the collective bargaining 
relationship, ought to fall outside the scope of immunity unless 
this impact is outweighed by some vitally important union pur-
pose. The NFL draft eligibility rule, though it may preserve and 
prolong employment for current unit members, has, as its direct 
effect, the restraint of amateur athletes who as yet are strangers to 
the bargaining relationship and does not significantly advance any 
important union goal. Restraining college undergraduates from 
competing for a position on an NFL team is in fact the direct ob-
ject of the agreement between the NFL and the National Football 
League Players Association (NFLPA). Like the small mine opera-
tors in Pennington, the non-New York City manufacturers in Al-
len Bradley, and the non-union subcontractors in Connell, th~se 
amateurs-still strangers to the bargaining relationship-are the 
direct (and only) object of the restraint. Immunity, therefore, can-
not be claimed. 
2. The Draft Eligibility Rule Is Not a Mandatory Subject of 
Bargaining 
The second prong of the test established in Mackey and Mc-
Court requires that the particular player restraint under scrutiny 
be a mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning of the 
National Labor Relations Act101 (NLRA) for the agreement on the 
(1961); Mountain Pacific Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957). In 
these industries, the hiring hall has served "to eliminate wasteful, time-consuming and re-
petitive scouting for jobs by individual workmen and haphazard uneconomical searches by 
employees." Id. at 896 n.8. No similar purpose is served by the NFL's draft eligibility rule. 
See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
101 The Act compels employers and unions to negotiate regarding wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment if demanded by either party. Section 158(a)(5) of 
the NLRA makes it unlawful for an employer to "refuse to bargain collectively" with the 
employees representative, subject to section 159(a). 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Section 159(a) 
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matter to be afforded immunity.102 The basis for this requirement 
is grounded in the several principles. First, as a matter of logic, if 
one body of law-labor law-mandates negotiation regarding a 
particular matter, another body of law-antitrust law-ought not 
condemn the fruits of that negotiation. Second, as a practical mat-
ter, such an outcome could serve to undermine the process of col-
lective bargaining; concerns regarding potential antitrust implica-
tions of a given proposal could impede progress toward resolution 
of important employer or employee concerns. If a union or one of 
its members could successfully challenge a matter on which agree-
ment had been reached, then the lesson learned would be that 
objectives won at the bargaining table might be later lost in court. 
The ultimate consequence would be a greater hesitancy to make 
concessions because the lawfulness of the quid pro quo was uncer-
tain.103 Finally, the statutory design of the NLRA places the union 
establishes that the employee representative is the exclusive representative for the purposes 
of collective bargaining regarding rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other condi-
tions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Section 158(d) defines collective bargaining as "the 
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employ-
ees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). These subjects establish the 
outer limits of the duty to bargain and within these areas bargaining is obligatory upon 
demand. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); 
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); see also, Cox, The Duty to 
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401 (1958); Cox & Dunlop, Regulations of Collec· 
tive Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1950); Ra-
bin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work: The Search for Standards 
in Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 803 (1971); Note, Proper 
Subjects for Collective Bargaining: Ad Hoc v. Predictive Definition, 58 YALE L.J. 803 
(1949). 
102 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. "To tell the parties that they must 
bargain about a point but may be subject to antitrust penalties if they reach an agreement is 
to stultify the congressional scheme." Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea 
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 711-12 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part). See also J. WEISTART & C. 
LOWELL, supra note 29, at 568; Jacobs & Winter, supra note 45, at 25-27. 
103 J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 29, at 559-61. See especially notes 482-84 
where the authors describe how the prospect of antitrust review of the Rozelle Rule dramat-
ically influenced and impeded progress toward a contract during the 1975 NFL-NFLPA ne-
gotiations. Jacobs and Winter further argue that antitrust review of mandatory subjects 
would remove one subject from the package of quids and quos resulting in greater likelihood 
the parties would be less satisfied than if the agreement were freely reached by them and, 
therefore that the congressional goal of labor peace and industrial stability would be under-
mined. "Denying a demand to a party may thus increase the chances of a strike because it 
lessens the area of possible compromise without affecting the underlying strength of the 
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and the employer at the bargaining table and delineates the mat-
ters they either must, may, or may not discuss.104 The parties are 
to be left on their own to negotiate the substantive terms of the 
bargain. As the Supreme Court has stated: "Within the area in 
which collective bargaining [is] required, Congress was not con-
cerned with the substantive terms upon which the parties 
agreed."105 Congress recognized that there are no absolute stan-
dards by which to assess the reasonableness or propriety of bar-
gained-for agreements106 and that courts are particularly inappro-
priate forums for making such determinations.107 
The requirement that the term under scrutiny must involve a 
mandatory subject of bargaining draws strength from Justice 
Goldberg's opinions, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, in 
Pennington and Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel 
Tea Co.108 Justice Goldberg's Jewel Tea opinion flatly stated: 
"[T]he Court should hold that, in order to effectuate congressional 
intent, collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining under the Labor Act is not subject to the anti-
trust laws."109 Justice White, in the opinion designated as that of 
the Court, also recognized the centrality of Goldberg's perspective. 
He wrote, "[E]mployers and unions are required to bargain about 
wages, hours and working conditions, and this fact weighs heavily 
in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements on these sub-
jects."110 The Supreme Court, however, has never embraced Justice 
Goldberg's per se approach. It has, instead, weighed the impor-
tance to labor of the issue under scrutiny against its impact on 
parties." Jacobs & Winter, supra note 45, at 13. For a rebuttal, see L. SoBEL, supra note 11, 
at 325-29. 
10
• See, e.g., Handler & Zifchak, supra note 39, at 253, 501. 
1
"" Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959). 
106 See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-90 (1960); Ja-
cobs & Winter, supra note 45, at 12-13. 
107 See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 49-50 (1968). See also Local 
189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 716-17 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
dissenting). 
106 Justice Goldberg concurred in the judgment in Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697, and dis-
sented in UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 672 (1965). 
109 381 U.S. at 710. 
110 Id. at 689. 
HeinOnline -- 33 Emory L. J. 400 1984
400 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33 
trade.m The Court's refusal to accord an automatic exemption to 
mandatory subjects strongly suggests that the second prong of the 
test set forth in Mackey and McCourt is, in fact, somewhat 
broader and more flexible than their holdings connote. 
As will be shown, the subject matter of the National Football 
League's draft eligibility rule is not a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining but is, instead, a permissive subject.112 Even if our charac-
terization of the rule as a permissive subject of bargaining is 
wrong, however, a contrary determination that the matter falls 
within the area of compulsory bargaining would not result in auto-
matic immunity.113 While examination of the draft eligibility rule 
111 In Jewel Tea, the Supreme Court baldly articulated a balancing test: 
The crucial determinant is not the form of the agreement-e.g., prices or 
wages-but its relative impact on the product market and the interests in union 
members. 
Id. at 690 n.5. 
[A]lthough the effect on competition is apparent and real, ... the concern of 
union members is immediate and direct. Weighing the respective interests in-
volved, we think the national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act places beyond the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements 
on when, as well as how long, employees must work. 
I d. at 691. Thus, the Court found the importance of the issue to labor to outweigh its impact 
on competition. Id. at 691. 
Professor Meltzer has observed that: "Whether any particular demand is exempt depends 
on weighing the interest in competition against the competing interests of the employees." 
Meltzer, supra note 39, at 724-26 (quote at 724). Professor Weistart and Lowell agree: "It is 
wholly proper that attention be given to the effect of a particular provision upon business 
competition. But the degree of restraint must be weighted against the type of employee 
interest at stake." J. WEISTART & C. LowELL, supra note 29, at 536. On the other hand, 
Professor St. Antoine suggests a serious caveat to the weighing process. St. Antoine, supra 
note 39, at 615-16. 
112 See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
113 See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 n.14 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 438 U.S. 
801 (1977). Professor Meltzer has observed that Jewel Tea teaches that "[t]he scope of [the] 
exemption was not co-extensive with the area of mandatory bargaining. Characterization of 
the subjects of agreement as mandatory appears, in other words, to be a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition of exemption." Meltzer, supra note 39, at 724. Connell Constr. Co. v. 
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), too, appears to forecast a narrow 
range of protection to be accorded employee interests. In Connell, the union's objective was 
to expand employment opportunities for members. Although this purpose is of central con-
cern to unions, the Supreme Court refused immunity. I d. at 621. "The primary importance 
of the decision would seem to be in its teaching that a direct, unmitigated market restraint 
will be sustained only where it is necessary to protect the most fundamental of employee 
interests." J. WEISTART & C. LowELL, supra note 29, at 539 (citations omitted). As we have 
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to determine whether it is a mandatory or a permissive subject of 
bargaining is an important inquiry under the Mackey-McCourt 
standard, the issue of immunity ultimately turns on weighing em-
ployee interests against the impact of the agreement on competi-
tion. Determining the character of the subject matter as a 
mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining will reveal much 
about the relative importance of the issue to employees and there-
fore will greatly facilitate the balancing process. 
The NLRA obligates employers to bargain collectively114 regard-
ing "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment"115 with the representative of his employees.U6 Together, 
then, these provisions extend the employer's obligation to bargain 
only as to those subjects within the meaning of "wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment" and only regarding the 
employer's "employees" in a "unit appropriate for such purposes" 
that the union represents.117 
For two reasons, the draft eligibility rule is not a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining. First, amateur athletes such as Walker are not 
employees to whom an employer's obligation to bargain flows. Sec-
ond, the subject matter itself, employment eligibility, is not within 
the definition of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment in this setting. 
argued, in the matter of Walker, the unmitigated restraint on entry to employment far out-
weighs the importance of the employee interests at stake. 
114 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) defines "bargain collectively" as "the performance of the mutual 
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment .... " Id. 
110 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to 
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provi-
sions of section 159(a)." Id. 
116 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) states: "Representative designated or selected for the purposes of 
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such pur-
poses, shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or 
other conditions of employment .... " Id. 
117 See supra notes 114-16. 
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a. Amateur athletes are not "employees" within the meaning of 
the NLRA 
In Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Co./18 the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the 
term "employee." The issue was whether the employer's unilateral 
modification of a health insurance program for retirees constituted 
an unlawful refusal to bargain. The Court first determined that re-
tirees were not "employees" to whom the duties of the Act 
:flowed.119 In the Court's view, the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act dictated that the definition of the term "employee" 
should not be stretched beyond its plain meaning, which included 
only those who worked for another for hire.120 Further, the Taft-
118 404 u.s. 157 (1971). 
119 Id. at 164-76 and cases cited therein. 
••• Id. at 166. 
The term "employee" is defined, unfortunately, by reference to itself. Section 152(3) of 
the Act provides: 
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the 
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states other-
wise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, 
or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor 
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent 
employment. 
29 u.s.c. § 152(3). 
Nevertheless, there was potent support for the Court's conclusion in Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass. In 1944, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 132, reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 
769 (1944), the Supreme Court had sustained the Board's finding that newsboys were "em-
ployees" rather than independent contractors. The Court affirmed the Board's conclusion 
and stated that Congress intended "a wider field than the narrow technical legal relation of 
'master and servant' as the common law had worked this out in all its variations .... " Id. 
at 124. Congress reacted to Hearst in 1947 by specifically excluding from the definition of 
"employee," "any individual having the status of independent contractor." The House Re-
port of the Taft-Hartley Act explained: 
An "employee," according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law as the 
courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone, . . . 
means someone who works for another for hire .... It must be presumed that 
when Congress passed the Labor Act, it intended words it used to have the mean-
ings that they had when Congress passed the act, not new meanings that, 9 years 
later, the Labor Board might think up. In the law, there always has been a differ-
ence, . . . between "employees" and "independent contractors." "Employees" 
work for wages or salaries under direct supervision .... It is inconceivable that 
Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to give to every word in 
the act whatever meaning it wished. On the contrary, Congress intended then, and 
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Hartley amendment made it clear that general agency principles 
were to be looked to for the purpose of distinguishing between 
"employees" and independent contractors.121 
Other important considerations support the narrow interpreta-
tion of "employee" and the conclusion that college undergraduates, 
like the retirees in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, are not "employees" 
within the meaning of the Act. A union is the exclusive bargaining 
representative only for the employees in an appropriate bargaining 
unit.122 An appropriate unit is limited by a well-established Na-
tional Labor Relations Board rule to those employees who share a 
"community of interestm23 and excludes those persons outside that 
community whose interests would be submerged in an over inclu-
sive and presumably unsyinpathetic, grouping.124 In addition to 
finding the pensioners outside the meaning of "employee," the 
Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass further concluded that active and 
retired employees "plainly do not share a community of interests 
broad enough to justify inclusion of the retirees in the bargaining 
unit.m25 
it intends now, that the Board give to words not far-fetched meanings but ordi-
nary meanings. 
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947). 
121 Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 168. See generally, C. MORRIS, supra note 51, at 
206-08, 772. .. 
122 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). R. GoRMAN, BASIC TExT ON LABOR LAW 379 (1976); Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 171. 
123 To determine whether a "community of interest" exists among groups of employees, 
the Board looks to factors such as: 
(1) similarity in the scale and manner of determining earnings; (2) similarity in 
employment benefits, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment; (3) similarity in the kind of work performed; (4) similarity in the qualifica-
tions, skills and training of the employees; (5) frequency of contact or interchange 
among the employees; (6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity or integration of 
production processes; (8) common supervision and determination of labor-rela-
tions policy; (9) relationship to the administrative organization of the employer; 
(10) history of collective bargaining; (11) desires of the affected employees; (12) 
extent of union organization. 
R. GORMAN, supra note 122, at 69. See 15 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 39 (1950); C. Morris, supra 
note 51, at 217-19. 
124 Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 172-73; Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 
N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1962); R. GORMAN, supra note 122, at 379. 
120 Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 173. The Court pointed to previous NLRB cases 
in which retirees had been excluded from a petitioned-for unit. I d. at 174-75. See, e.g., In re 
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Although they are merely prospective employees, undergraduate 
football players, clearly have a co-existing interest in future wages 
and benefits along with active unit members. As regards the matter 
at hand, however-entry barriers to employment-the interests of 
active and prospective players are diametrically opposed. Greater 
access to employment for prospective players will result in margin-
ally less job security for active players. Thus, like the Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass pensioners who could not appropriately be grouped 
with active employees, undergraduate players such as Walker, be-
cause they are not employees, could not be appropriately placed in 
the same collective bargaining unit as active players. For example, 
Walker could not be eligible to vote in an election to determine the 
selection of a bargaining representative.126 This denial of suffrage 
is critical. As the Court has pointed out: "[I]t would be clearly in-
consistent with the majority rule principle of the Act to deny a 
member of the unit at the time of an election a voice in the selec-
tion of his bargaining representative."~27 
Since college undergraduates are not "employees" within the 
meaning of the Act, and could neither be included in a bargaining 
unit with active players nor vote for the selection of a bargaining 
representative, the duty to bargain on their "terms and conditions 
of employment" does not attach. 
Public Service Corp., 72 N.L.R.B. 224, 229-30 (1947); In re J.S. Young Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 
1174, 1175 (1944). The Court recognized the common concern of active and retired employ-
ees in assuring that the latter's benefits remained adequate, but also noted that the union 
might see fit to bargain for improved wages or other conditions at the expense of retirees' 
benefits. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 4.04 U.S. at 173. 
128 Retirees in Pittsburgh Plate Glass were similarly found ineligible to vote. 404 U.S. 
at 174-75. Moreover, the NLRB has consistently held "that for one to be able to vote in a 
representation election, the person must be employed during the established payroll eligibil-
ity period and must also be employed on the day of the election." Macy's Missouri-Kansas 
Div. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 835, 842 (8th Cir. 1968). See Gulf States Asphalt Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 
1212, 1214 (1953). 
127 Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 175. As the Court recognized, this principle does 
not go so far as to preclude the NLRB from establishing reasonable regulations governing 
Board-conducted elections. For example, the Board may legitimately deny a ballot to em-
ployees hired after the eligibility cut-off date. Id. at 175 n.15. See also Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass, 177 N.L.R.B. 911, 919 (member Zagoria dissenting), enforcement denied, 427 F.2d 
936 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 157 (1971). 
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b. The draft eligibility rule is not a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining under the NLRA 
As shown earlier, the employer's duty to bargain goes only to 
those matters falling within the statutory formulation of "wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."128 While 
the Act does not immutably fix a list of subjects within the statu-
tory requirement, 129. one may say that mandatory subjects charac-
teristically must settle an aspect of the employer-employee rela-
tionship.130 At the same time, permissive subjects fall into two 
groups. One group's primary characteristics are that the subject 
concerns the relationship of the employer to third persons and is 
traditionally considered within the prerogative of management.131 
It is beyond cavil that Walker is such a third person and the condi-
tions upon which he may be hired are normally matters within the 
prerogative of management. 
Nevertheless, as the Court observed in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 
there are some important exceptions to the rule that "matters in-
volving individuals outside the employment relationship do not fall 
within [the mandatory] category."~32 In each case in which an ex-
ception has been found, however, it has been based upon a deter-
mination that in addition to involving parties outside the relation-
ship, the issue also "vitally" affects the terms and conditions of 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 101, 104-07. Cf. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 
at 176-82. 
129 During consideration of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, the House Bill 
contained an actual list of mandatory subjects of bargaining. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 2(11) (1947) reprinted in 1 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 31, 40 (1948). Congress rejected this approach in favor of 
continuing to vest the NLRB with power to define mandatory subjects of bargaining on a 
case-by-case basis. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 n.14 
(1981). See also McCormick, Union Representatives as Corporate Directors: The Challenge 
to the Adversarial Model of Labor Relations, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 219, 227 n.42 (1982). 
130 
"In general terms, the limitation in [§ 8(d)] includes only issues that settle an aspect 
of the relationship between the employer and employees." Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 
at 178. R. GORMAN, supra note 123, at 523; cf. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 
349 {1958) ("wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" are mandatory 
subjects of bargaining). 
131 R. GORMAN, supra note 122, at 523. 
132 404 U.S. at 178. See R. GoRMAN, supra note 122, at 528-29. 
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employment of active employees.133 Thus, in Local 24, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver/34 for example, the 
union and the employer negotiated a minimum rental fee that the 
employer would pay to truck owners who used their own vehicles 
in the employer's service in place of the employer's own employees. 
Due to the direct and potentially devastating impact of an inade-
quate rental fee on the employees' job security, the Court con-
cluded that the term "was integral to the establishment of a stable 
wage structure for [employees]"~35 and, consequently, held that it 
was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Similarly, in Fibreboard 
Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 136 the Court held that a subcon-
tracting provision that replaced employees in the existing unit with 
those of an independent contractor to perform the same work 
under similar working conditions was a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining. Again, however, the critical factor in determining whether 
the bargaining subject was mandatory was that the third party 
matter and employee job security were intimately and directly 
related. 
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, on the other hand, the Court found 
that the effect of p_ensioners' insurance benefits on active employ-
ees was too insubstantial to bring the issue within the collective 
bargaining obligation.137 In the Court's view, the effect of pension-
ers' insurance benefits on the "terms and conditions of employ-
ment" of active employees was "hardly comparable to the loss of 
jobs threatened in Oliver and Fibreboard."138 The Court further 
133 Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 179. As a result, "[t]he employer may be obli-
gated to bargain about payments to third persons which directly threaten the wages of its 
own employees, or about subcontracting to third parties." R. GORMAN, supra note 123, at 
529. See also UMW, 231 N.L.R.B. 573 (1978). There, the Board determined that a succes-
sorship clause was a mandatory subject of bargaining because "agreement in this regard 
would vitally affect the terms and conditions of employment of the miners who survive such 
a change in ownership." !d. at 575. 
134 358 u.s. 283 (1959). 
130 United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370, 383 n.26 (1962) (discussing Oliver, 358 U.S. at 
294). 
138 379 u.s. 203 (1964). 
137 404 U.S. at 180. 
138 /d. The Court recognized that active employees might benefit by the inclusion of 
retired employees under the same health insurance contract as active employees because 
adding persons to the group generally tends to lower the overall rates for coverage. The 
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observed that the interests of active and retired employees might 
not be harmonious. Although the union might find it advantageous 
to bargain for improvements in pensioners' benefits, it might 
nevertheless find improvement of current income for active em-
ployees to be a more desirable objective. 
In the matter of Walker, the draft eligibility rule erects an artifi-
cial obstacle to employment for amateur athletes that incidentally 
benefits marginal players whose place on team rosters would be 
threatened by the rule's abolition. This benefit could hardly be 
said to "vitally" affect the terms and conditions of employment for 
unit members. Moreover, the situation is not even remotely analo-
gous to the wholesale loss of jobs for unit employees threatened in 
Oliver and Fibreboard. In fact, the interests of current and pro-
spective employees are far more at odds than they are in harmony. 
It is, of course, possible that the NFLP A would seek the removal 
of the rule. The far greater likelihood, however, is that the union 
would less vigorously represent the interests of persons not yet em-
ployed when those interests conflicted with the job security of ac-
tive players. 
The draft eligibility rule concerns the relationship between the 
employing clubs and persons outside the collective bargaining rela-
tionship without vitally affecting active players. In addition, the 
interests of prospective players and active players regarding the 
rule conflict. As a result, the draft eligibility rule does not come 
within the exception to the rule that matters involving persons 
outside the employment relationship are permissive rather than 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. Being a non-mandatory subject, 
the eligibility rule fails the second prong of the Mackey-McCourt 
standard, and consequently, should not be immunized from anti-
trust interdiction. 
It might appear obvious that during his college years Walker was 
Court, nevertheless, found this impact to be "speculative and insubstantial at best." I d. The 
NLRB in Pittsburgh Plate Glass had also observed that "changes in retirement benefits for 
retired employees affect the availability of employer funds for active employees." 177 
N.L.R.B. at 915. The Court answered that this impact on active employees was, as well, "too 
insubstantial" to render the subject a matter of compulsory negotiation. 404 U.S. at 176-77 
n.17. 
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not an employee and that the draft eligibility rule concerns neither 
wages, hours, nor working conditions. This lengthy inquiry into the 
nature of the subject matter is necessary, however, because under 
certain circumstances, persons outside the bargaining unit, includ-
ing applicants for employment139 and registrants at hiring halls, 140 
are "employees" within the ambit of the Act. It is also true that 
hiring halls, which have the effect of regulating access to employ-
ment opportunities, are mandatory subjects of bargaining.141 
Therefore, an argument by analogy might be tendered that the 
draft eligibility rule constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining 
that ought to be afforded immunity from antitrust scrutiny. While 
the matter is not wholly free from doubt, on balance it appears 
that the context in which the draft eligibility rule arises is suffi-
ciently distinguishable from that of hiring halls to conclude that 
the subject matter of the rule does not constitute a mandatory bar-
gaining subject. In the NLRB cases that held the Act to encompass 
prospective employees, the issue arose in the context of an em-
ployer's refusal to hire, or a union's refusal to refer for employ-
ment, rather than in the bargaining context presented here. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, the extension of the Act's protec-
tion against discrimination to job applicants "is an inevitable co-
rollary of the principle of organization. Discrimination against 
union labor in the hiring of men is a dam to self-organization at 
the source of supply.m42 As has been shown, however, and as the 
Court recognized in Pittsburgh Plate Glass/43 democratic princi-
ples underlying the Act preclude the representation aspects of the 
Act from attaching before an employee's actual hire.144 
••• Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182-87 (1941). 
140 Local 872, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 163 N.L.R.B. 586 (1967). 
141 Houston Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 143 N.L.R.B. 409, 441 (1963), enforced, 
349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966). 
142 Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 185. See Atlantic Maintenance Co. v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 
604 (3d Cir. 1962) (an employer's discriminatory refusal to hire an applicant is a violation 
despite the employer arguing that persons must be "employees" to come within the Act's 
protection). See also Local 872, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 162 N.L.R.B. 586 (1967) (union 
unlawfully refused to consider applications for employment and requests for desirable jobs 
from persons who were not union members and persons who had filed unfair labor practice 
charges against union). 
143 See supra text accompanying note 127. 
, .. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27. Two NLRB members have stated: "AI· 
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While it is true that hiring halls frequently constitute mandatory 
subjects of bargaining, an argument by analogy that the draft eligi-
bility rule also constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining fails. 
In Houston Chapter, Associated General Contractors,145 the 
NLRB held that employment included the initial act of hire and 
that the hiring halls was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The 
NLRB stated that: "[W]e do not deem the Supreme Court to have 
limited its definition of 'employees' to those individuals already 
working for the employer. Rather, the Court contemplated pro-
spective employees as also within the definition."146 Consequently, 
the Board extended the scope of mandatory bargaining to include 
matters directly affecting prospective employees. It must be em-
phasized, however, that the Board found it "highly significant" 
that the case arose in the context of the building and construction 
industry-"an industry characterized by intermittent employment 
which has received special statutory consideration."147 Because em-
ployees are frequently laid off and rehired within the construction 
industry, active and prospective employees share a strong mutual 
concern about opportunities for employment which are directly af-
fected by the job priority standards established by the hiring 
hall.148 The professional football industry is the antithesis of the 
construction industry in that employees are frequently employed 
though the Court [in Phelps Dodge] held that the Act protects applicants for employment 
against discrimination in the hiring process, that case by no means stands for the proposi-
tion that prospective employees are employees as to whom bargaining is mandatory under 
Section [158(d).]" Houston Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 143 N.L.R.B. 409, 417 (1963) 
(members Rodgers and Leedom, dissenting), enforced, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966). 
uo 143 N.L.R.B. 409 (1963), enforced, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 
u.s. 1026 (1966). 
us Id. at 412 (citations omitted). 
u• Id. 
us The court of appeals in Houston Chapter also placed great emphasis on the factual 
setting for the hiring hall demand. The Court found that: 
The record here discloses that employment in the construction trade is transitory 
in nature, with employees moving from job to job and employer to employer. The 
nature of the employment does not lend itself to employee security through se-
niority rights. The proposal of the union was to establish a system of seniority 
rights and job priority through the use of non-discriminatory hiring hall. 
349 F.2d at 452. The court in NLRB v. Tom Joyce Floors, 353 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1965), 
found hiring halls to be a mandatory subject of bargaining for the same reason. 
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by a single employer for the duration of their careers.149 
The purpose of the draft eligibility rule is primarily to provide 
NFL teams with a farm system for the training of future players. 
This benefit inures solely to employers and provides no contempo-
raneous benefit to employees. The entire justification for hiring 
halls is grounded on their value in "eliminat[ing] wasteful, time-
consuming, and repetitive scouting for jobs by individual workmen 
and haphazard uneconomical searches by employers.mr;o It is clear 
that the justification for the extension of mandatory subjects of 
bargaining to encompass union hiring halls in the construction in-
dustry does not apply in professional football. It is also clear that 
most matters regarding the conditions precedent to the establish-
ment of working conditions are not within the duty to bargain.1111 
Accordingly, the NFL rule does not come within the narrow excep-
tion to the rule that prehire matters are .non-mandatory subjects of 
bargaining and falls short of the second prong of the Mackey-Me-
Court test. Any argument suggesting that the draft eligibility rule 
"" The average playing career of an NFL player is 4.6 years. NFLPA, Q. Why a Per-
centage of Gross? 4 (Sept. 1981) (a report to NFLPA members). In 1981, of 137 players who 
were free agents, none were signed by a different team. Since 1977, a total of 510 players 
have been free agents. Six have been signed by new teams. Id. at 34. 
••• Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 672 (1961) (quoting 
Mountain Pacific Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 896 n.8 (1957)). In 
the unlikely event the draft eligibility arrangement was viewed as being sufficiently like a 
hiring hall to make the issue a mandatory subject of bargaining, the arrangement would 
necessarily be analogized to an exclusive hiring hall. It is well established that a union vio-
lates sections 158(b)(1)(A) and 158(b)(2) of the NLRA when it operates a hiring hall upon 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious considerations. See, e.g., Journeymen Pipe Fitters Lo-
cal 392, 252 N.L.R.B. 417 (1980); Painters Local 1555, 241 N.L.R.B. 741 (1979); Laborers, 
Int'l Union, Local 282, 236 N.L.R.B. 621 (1978); International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Lo-
cal 433, 228 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1977), enforced, 600 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 915 (1980); Local174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 226 N.L.R.B. 690 (1976). The require-
ments of the draft eligibility rule are wholly irrelevant to the successful performance of the 
job of a professional football player. Therefore, considerations such as those embodied in 
the draft eligibility rule would be outside those upon which the union could permissibly 
exclude applicants . 
.., For example, in Local 164, Bhd. of Painters of America, 126 N.L.R.B. 997 (1960), 
enforced, 293 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961), the Board considered 
the question whether a union proposal that the employer post a performance bond was a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. The Board decided that it was unwilling to say that a 
condition precedent to employment is a condition of employment, such as wages and hours, 
in the meaning of the statute. 126 N.L.R.B. at 1002. 
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is sufficiently like the hiring hall to make bargaining over the sub-
ject obligatory overlooks the fact that the hiring hall serves a 
unique and important function in the setting of industries with 
frequent employee turnover. The draft eligibility rule serves no 
analogous function. 
3. Bona Fide Arm's-Length Bargaining 
The third prong of the ]}fackey-McCourt standard requires that 
the restraint under scrutiny be a product of vigorous collective bar-
gaining before immunity will attach. In both Mackey and Mc-
Court, the critical factor was the extent to which the free agent 
indemnity rule under challenge was the product of actual bargain-
ing. In Mackey, as in the present situation, the rule under scrutiny 
had been made part of the collective bargaining contract between 
the NFL and the NFLP A through incorporation by reference.152 
The League there argued, as it could be expected to in a challenge 
to the draft eligibility rule, that the rule's incorporation into the 
collective bargaining contract immunized it from antitrust scru-
tiny. The Mackey court, however, determined that the Rozelle 
Rule was not, in fact, the product of "bona-fide arm's-length bar-
gaining."153 The court reviewed the recent bargaining history and 
found that the rule remained unchanged since its unilateral imple-
mentation prior to collective bargaining.154 The opinion affirmed 
the district court's finding that the union had received no quid pro 
quo for the rule's inclusion in the collective bargaining contract.155 
In McCourt the district court noted that the terms of the chal-
lenged contractual provision were identical to a rule adopted by 
the owners three years earlier.156 Therefore, the court concluded 
that the rule had been "unilaterally" included in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, was not the product of bona fide arm's-length 
102 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 
(1977). 
103 !d. at 616. 
m Id. at 610-13. 
100 Id. at 616. 
108 McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904, 910-11 (E.D. Mich. 1978), va-
cated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). 
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bargaining and would not come within the labor exemption.157 The 
Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's characterization of 
the bargaining process. The appellate court observed that the play-
ers' association had employed several bargaining tactics, including 
the threat of a strike and antitrust litigation, 158 but had failed in 
its effort to alter the League's position on this issue.159 Since the 
League had assented to other benefits in exchange for the provi-
sion under challenge, its inclusion in the agreement was the result 
of legitimate, albeit hard, bargaining.160 Available evidence reveals 
that the draft eligibility rule, incorporated by reference into the 
collective bargaining agreement is not the product of actual give-
and-take during negotiations.161 This fact alone places the matter 
beyond the standard for immunity set forth in Mackey and 
McCourt. 
In addition, although the requirement of actual bargaining has 
not been a factor in Supreme Court review of the labor exemp-
tion, 162 it has been a critical determinant in antitrust challenges to 
reserve system components in professional sports.163 In Philadel-
'"' Id. 
108 600 F.2d at 1202. 
'"" Id. at 1202 n.12. 
180 Id. at 1203. 
181 Interview with Richard A. Berthelsen, Assistant Executive Director, NFLPA (Janu-
ary 9, 1982). According to Berthelsen, discussion of the draft eligibility rule had been specif· 
ically excluded from collective negotiations. At the same time, however, the Preamble to the 
1977 agreement between the NFL and the NFLPA states: "Whereas, the NFLPA and the 
Management Council mutually acknowledge that this Agreement is the product of bona fide, 
arms-length collective bargaining." NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement 6 (Mar. 1, 
1977). 
182 Indeed, in Supreme Court cases, the unions and not the employers had initially pro· 
posed and bargained for the adoption of the challenged restraints. See, e.g., Local 189, 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Connell Constr. Co. v. 
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). See also Weistart, supra note 89, 
at 113-14. 
183 See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 288 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Reyn-
olds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 
904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979), Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 
420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979); 
Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 
606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, 
Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
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phia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 
for example, a franchisee of the fledgling World Hockey Associa-
tion alleged that the National Hockey League (NHL) reserve 
clause, league affiliation agreements, and other devices to control 
player mobility were violative of the antitrust laws.164 The district 
court, in finding for the plaintiffs, 165 gave careful attention to the 
extent of actual bargaining between the NHL and the Player's As-
sociation over the reserve system restraints under attack. The 
court observed that the matter had originally been inserted in indi-
vidual player contracts before the advent of the players' union. 
The court, while finding as a matter of fact that the arrangement 
under attack had been "discussed," refused to conclude that it was 
a product of "collective bargaining."~66 Similarly, in Robertson v. 
NBA,167 a group of professional basketball players attacked compo-
nents of the reserve system and the draft as impermissible re-
straints on trade. The League urged a two-prong standard for im-
munity: "(1) Are the challenged practices directed against non-
parties to relationship; if they are not, then (2) are they mandatory 
subjects of collective bargaining? If the answer to No. l is no and 
to No. 2 yes, the practices are immune .... "168 The court stated 
that if the practices under scrutiny had been the subject of collec-
tive bargaining, then a subsequent agreement might have been in-
sulated from antitrust interdiction. In Robertson, however, the 
court found as a matter of fact there had been no tradeoff or ex-
change between the parties over the issue. The court embraced the 
164 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
160 The court enjoined the National Hockey League from bringing actions against play-
ers whose contracts, but for the reserve clause, had expired. Id. at 519. 
166 351 F. Supp. at 484-86. The court found that the players' association had not re-
ceived any trade-offs in return for an agreement to maintain the clause and that although 
the players' association had requested a modification in the reserve clause, neither side had 
modified its position. The court noted that in Supreme Court cases, a grant of immunity 
had followed actual collective bargaining and held that such immunity in this case failed for 
want of "serious, intensive, arm's-length collective bargaining." Id. at 499. The court also 
took note that in all Supreme Court cases addressing the labor exemption, the putative 
restraint had been sought by the union while here the union opposed the matter. I d. at 498. 
167 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
166 Id. at 886 (NBA argued this standard was derived from UMW v. Pennington, 381 
U.S. 667 (1965), and Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 
(1965)). 
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same standard set forth in Philadelphia World Hockey, namely, 
"[s]erious, intensive, arm's-length bargaining."169 
It appears that the justification for the requirement of actual ne-
gotiations is two-fold. First, actual bargaining is strong evidence 
that, in the end, the union considered and approved of the re-
straint.170 Given the origins of the exemption as a protective device 
for unions, such a requirement has been thought necessary by re-
viewing courts.171 Second, to the extent that labor exemption doc-
trine has been extended to insulate collective bargaining agree-
ments as well as union activities from antitrust review, the 
requirement insures that actual bargaining takes place and pre-
vents the exemption from becoming a mechanism by which em-
ployers utilize a weak union to shield otherwise unlawful 
activities.172 
It would appear, however, that the requirement of "actual bar-
gaining" is fraught with danger and should be applied only in nar-
rowly circumscribed situations. The distinction between discussion 
and bargaining is too obscure to discriminate the licit from the il-
licit. The NLRA, of course, requires that parties bargain in good 
faith over mandatory subjects of bargaining.173 While the Board 
will outlaw disengenuous or "surface bargaining,"174 there is no re-
quirement that parties modify original positions or otherwise make 
••• Id. (quoting Philadelphia World Hockey, 351 F. Supp. at 499-500). 
110 To the extent that a general principle emerges from the [Robertson] case, it 
seems to be the same point made by the court in Philadelphia World Hockey: the 
labor exemption will be applied only to those practices which have been approved 
by the union. The approval which is given must be more than passive acquies-
cence and be the product of serious, good faith bargaining. 
J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 29, at 573 (citations omitted). 
111 See id. 
112 In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the Court held that the labor 
exemption immunized a union from antitrust liability for certain secondary boycott activi· 
ties "so long as a union acts in its self interest" and does not conspire with non-labor 
groups. Id. at 232. Hutcheson has "had significant effect in cementing the notion that the 
promotion of employee interests was a critical ingredient in the grant of the exemption." 
Weistart, supra note 89, at 114 n.30. 
113 See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Co., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); see also 
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
114 See, e.g., NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953). 
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exchanges as to any particular matter.175 
The particular posture under which the prior sports cases arose 
unquestionably contributed to the development of the requirement 
of "actual" bargaining. In all such cases, the employment terms 
under scrutiny antedated the establishment of a mature collective 
bargaining relationship between the owners and players. The un-
ions were, relatively speaking, weak.176 Later, when a component of 
the reserve system appeared in a collective bargaining agreement 
and was challenged by disaffected players, the teams sought a 
grant of immunity under the labor exemption. Courts were unwill-
ing to permit the employers to use the union as a shield to protect 
them from clear liability for restraints which were, in effect, unilat-
erally imposed. Given the fact that the original purpose of the la-
bor exemption was to protect unions and their legitimate organiza-
tional and collective bargaining activities, the prospect that the 
labor exemption doctrine might be used as "a cat's-paw to pull the 
employers' chestnuts out of the antitrust fires"177 was an unsavory 
one for courts. Since the unions in professional sports have ma-
tured, however, there is less justification for the requirement of 
"actual bargaining" when the subject matter appears in the collec-
tive bargaining contract.178 Now there is considerably more reason 
· to assume that if a matter appears in a collective bargaining con-
tract, either directly or by reference, that it is the product of 
arm's-length bargaining.179 
If bona fide arm's-length bargaining were the only ground for 
finding the eligibility rule not covered by the Jabor exemption, 
then one should not conclude that the matter falls outside the area 
of immunity. Given the determination stated earlier that the mat-
ter fails all three prongs of the standard, however, lack of actual 
170 See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956). 
176 See generally Krasnow & Levy, Unionization and Professional Sports, 51 GEo. L.J. 
749, 759-66 (1963). 
177 United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1948). 
178 Professor Weistart has argued, "If the parties to the disputed agreement have a 
long-standing and well-established bargaining relationship ... it is difficult to imagine the 
justification for questioning the effectiveness of either side's consent to a particular term in 
a particular negotiation." Weistart, supra note 89, at 128-29 (citation omitted). 
179 Id. at 128-31. 
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bargaining is one more justification for not extending immunity. 
More importantly, the fact that the draft eligibility rule has not 
been subjected to actual negotiation gives rise to the question of 
what effect vigorous bargaining between the NFL and the NFLP A 
should have upon labor exemption applicability. Realistically, this 
· third prong of the Mackey-McCourt standard adds nothing to the 
necessary analytical task of balancing employee interests against 
anticompetitive effects. Because the third prong of the standard is 
the least justifiable measure of labor exemption applicability, it 
can be concluded that even if the parties were to vigorously bar-
gain over the draft eligibility rule, a subsequent agreement on the 
matter would not immunize the rule under the labor exemption. 
This section has demonstrated that the draft eligibility rule 
clearly fails the first two prongs of the Mackey-McCourt test for 
applying the labor exemption. The effect of the restraint on trade 
does not fall primarily only on the parties to the collective bargain-
ing relationship but on college football"players who are precluded 
from joining professional leagues. The eligibility rule is not a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining as defined by statute 
and judicial precedent. Moreover, even if the rule meets the third 
prong of the test and was actually bargained for, which is a diffi-
cult factual determination under the circumstances, that fact 
would and should not be sufficient to apply the labor exemption. It 
would not justify exemption because the test is cumulative rather 
than alternative, and all three prongs must be met. It should not 
justify exemption because the presence or absence of actual bar-
gaining over a provision adds little to the analysis of its effect on 
the conflicting goals of antitrust law and labor law-unrestrained 
economic competition versus protection of legitimate employee 
concerns. Inasmuch as the labor exemption is not available to save 
the draft eligibility rule from antitrust scrutiny, the next section 
examines the rules of both leagues under substantive antitrust 
doctrine. 
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III. THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
The basic policy of the federal antitrust laws is to prohibit un-
reasonable restraints on economic competition.180 One of the oldest 
and best established of these restraints is a contract which unrea-
sonably forbids anyone from practicing his calling.181 When an ath-
lete is declared ineligible for the professional football draft, he is 
effectively prevented from practicing his trade. 
The draft eligibility rule is only one of a number of player re-
straint rules which have been imposed upon professional athletes 
by the concerted action of team owners. Many of these rules di-
rectly restrained competition for player services by impeding the 
free movement of players between teams. 182 Because these rules 
were the product of an agreement by the owners which seriously 
interfered with a player's ability to freely practice his trade, they 
were challenged as illegal under the Sherman Act. In most cases, 
the players successfully claimed that the rules were concerted re-
fusals to deal or group boycotts, which unreasonably restrained 
competition for player services.183 Since the draft eligibility rule is 
180 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-60 (1911). The Court said: 
[T]he dread of enhancement of prices - .. which ... would flow from the undue 
limitation on competitive conditions caused by contracts or other acts . . . led . . . 
to the prohibition ... [of] all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restric-
tive of competitive conditions, either from the[ir] nature ... or where ... the[y] 
had not been entered into or performed with legitimate purpose of reasonably 
forwarding personal interest and developing trade . . . . 
Id. at 58. 
181 Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949) (opinion by L. Hand). 
182 Typical examples are: (1) reserve and option clauses, (2) the draft, and (3) no-tam-
pering rules. See generally J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 29, at 500-24. 
183 Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (league rule declaring that 
players younger than twenty years of age were not eligible for the WHA draft struck down); 
Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (NFL player draft, as it existed in 1968, struck down); Mack-
ey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (Rozelle Rule, which required compen-
sating a player's former employer if he signed with another team, was struck down on the 
ground that it deterred clubs from signing free agents); Bowman v. NFL, 402 F. Supp. 754 
(D. Minn. 1975) (league resolution which prevented players from the defunct WFL from 
signing contracts with NFL teams until the season ended declared illegal); Kapp v. NFL, 
390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 
907 (1979) (group boycott of quarterback Joe Kapp for refusing to sign standard player 
HeinOnline -- 33 Emory L. J. 418 1984
418 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33 
a restraint on competition for the services of college athletes, it too 
is illegal if it unreasonably restrains competition. Any inquiry into 
the legality of the rule must begin with a review of the Supreme 
Court cases dealing with boycotts and concerted refusals to deal. 
A. The Supreme Court-Boycotts and Concerted Refusals to 
Deal 
While section I of the Sherman Act,184 if read literally, would 
condemn every type of concerted restraint of trade, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the statute as prohibiting only undue or un-
reasonable restraints of trade.185 This rule of reason as formulated 
QY the Court left a good deal open to inquiry and proved difficult 
and time-consuming to apply. Under the rule, it is first necessary 
to perform an in-depth analysis of the facts of the case to identify 
the exact nature of the practice involved. The trial court is re-
quired to hear evidence concerning the purpose of the activity. If it 
is determined that the purpose of the practice was to limit compe-
tition, then it is declared illegal. If, on the other hand, it is deter-
mined that there was no anticompetitive purpose, the inquiry is 
not at an end. It is then necessary to assess the effect on competi-
tion. If the net effect of the practice is to lessen competition, then 
it is likewise illegal.186 
contract held illegal); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. 
Cal. 1971) (NBA's version of the Four-Year Rule declared illegal). 
184 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This section states that: "Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or cpnspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. 
18
" Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-60 (1911). In this case there was no 
reason to engraft upon section 1 of the Sherman Act a qualification of reasonableness. Stan-
dard Oil controlled almost 90% of the nation's refining capacity. It had achieved this posi-
tion by employing business practices which could not be justified as normal competitive 
practices. It had coerced railroads into granting it preferential rates, engaged in local price 
discrimination and business espionage, and committed other vicious acts intended to force 
local competitor!! out of business. !d. Chief Justice White went beyond these clear facts and 
attempted a lengthy, and for this case unnecessary, statutory explication resulting in the 
rule of reason. 
188 The test of legality is whether the restraint imposed merely regulates competition, 
or suppresses or destroys competition. To determine that question, the court must ordina-
rily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint and its actual or 
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It did not take very long for the Court to determine that there 
are certain types of agreements which have such a pernicious effect 
on competition that they can be conclusively presumed illegal 
without any elaborate inquiry into the precise harm which they 
caused.187 This principle of per se unreasonableness has been ap-
plied to price fixing, 188 market divisions, 189 boycotts, 190 and tying 
arrangements.191 
Whenever a court discusses per se violations, it invariably men-
tions group boycotts and concerted refusals to deal.192 The Su-
preme Court has been quick to condemn such restraints in lan-
guage which implies that these arrangements are always a violation 
of the Sherman Act. In Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United 
probable effect. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopt-
ing the particular remedy, and the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant 
facts. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
187 In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) the defendants, who 
controlled 82% of the market, had formed a cartel which fixed prices and limited sales to 
specified jobbers. Defendants were convicted in a criminal case. The court of appeals re-
versed, holding incorrect an instruction to the jury that if they found price fixing they 
should not consider whether or not the prices fixed were reasonable. The Supreme Court 
reinstated the verdict. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Stone, it ruled that the trial court had 
been right, saying: 
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination 
of one form of competition .... The reasonable price fixed today may through 
economic or business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once 
established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of competi-
tion secured by the agreement. . . . Agreements which create such potential 
power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, 
without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or 
unreasonable . . . . 
!d. at 397. Read literally, the cases hold that proof of the mere existence of a price-fixing 
agreement establishes defendant's illegal purpose and that the prosecution need show noth-
ing further. See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
188 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Albrecht v. The Her-
ald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 
(1951). 
189 United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
190 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broad-
way-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 
457 (1941). 
191 United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); International Salt 
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
192 L. SULLIVAN, supra note 40, at 229, 261. 
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States/93 for example, a group of film distributors agreed that they 
would include in every standard exhibitor contract a clause which 
required arbitration of all disputes. They further agreed that none 
of them would deal with any exhibitor who refused to agree to such 
terms. The Court rejected the industry's claim that the clause in 
its agreement requiring that there be no dealing with non-comply-
ing exhibitors was necessary to protect the industry against unde-
sirable practices. The opinion stated, "It may be that arbitration is 
well adapted to the needs of the motion picture industry; but when 
under the guise of arbitration parties enter into unusual arrange-
ments which unreasonably suppress normal competition their ac-
tion becomes illegal. "~94 
Similarly, in Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC/9" when a 
group of manufacturers of women's clothing agreed to refuse to sell 
their products to any retailer who sold garments which had been 
copied from a guild member, the Court had no difficulty finding 
that such a practice was illegal.196 The defendants' aim to protect 
themselves from allegedly illegal conduct was no justification. The 
Court held that "[u]nder these circumstances it was not error to 
refuse to hear the evidence offered, for the reasonableness of the 
methods pursued by the combination to accomplish its unlawful 
object is no more material than would be the reasonableness of the 
prices fixed by unlawful combination."~97 
In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,198 the Court reiter-
ated that group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal could not be 
saved by allegations that they were reasonable.199 In keeping with 
193 282 u.s. 30 (1930). 
194 I d. at 43. Any doubt about whether a per se approach was being used in these cases 
was dispelled when the Court said: "The law is its own measure of right and wrong, of what 
it permits, or forbids, and the judgment of the courts cannot be set up against it in a sup-
posed accommodation of its policy with the good intention of parties, and it may be, of some 
good results." Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912). 
19
" 312 u.s. 457 (1941). 
199 Id. at 468. 
197 Id. at 468. 
199 359 u.s. 207 (1959). 
199 Id. at 212. In Klor's, a large department store used its economic power to coerce 
then national appliance manufacturers and their distributors to stop selling to a competing 
appliance store. Id. at 209. 
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its rigid view regarding such practices, the Court has held that the 
agreement of a group of automobile dealers to encourage General 
Motors to stop selling to discount outlets was a classic conspiracy 
amounting to a group boycott and therefore per se illegal. 200 
Based on the above cases, it would seem that any concerted ac-
tion by competitors, including a league's concerted refusal to draft 
a college football player, constitutes a per se violation of the Act. 
There is, however, the possibility that under certain circumstances, 
an otherwise per se violation might be permitted if it comes within 
the so-called Silver exception. 
1. The Silver Exception 
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,201 the Court indicated 
that under certain circumstances a practice which would ordinarily 
be a per se violation of the Sherman Act might be permitted. In 
holding that the Exchange had violated the Sherman Act because 
it excluded a broker from access to its facilities without a hearing, 
the Court stated that "absent any justification derived from the 
policy of another statute or otherwise," the action of the Exchange 
would be illegal per se.202 This language implies that the Court has 
left the door open for otherwise impermissible restraints in certain 
types of self-regulatory schemes. 
Whether the door is merely cracked or flung wide open, however, 
has been the subject of much debate. Some believe that Silver sets 
forth a very narrow exception mandated by legislative action.203 
200 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). 
201 373 U.S. 341 (1963). Silver was a securities dealer in Dallas, Texas. His firm was not 
a member of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). Initially, the New York Stock Ex-
change gave "temporary approval" to Silver to establish direct private telephone connec-
tions to several NYSE member firms as well as stock ticker service directly from the floor of 
the Exchange in New York City. Subsequently, without prior notice to Silver, the NYSE 
decided to disapprove these connections and instructed its member firms to disconnect the 
lines to Silver. 
202 Id. at 348-49. 
203 Blalock v. Ladies Prof'l Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265-67 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (the 
suspension of the plaintiff for alleged cheating was declared unlawful per se because players 
excluded a rival from the market and thus effected " 'a naked restraint of trade' " through 
defendant's "completely unfettered, subjective discretion") (quoting McQuade Tours, Inc. v. 
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Others read the case more expansively,204 and have set forth the 
following three requirements: 
(1) The industry structure requires self-regulation. 
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end 
consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation, (b) is rea-
sonably related to that goal, and (c) is no more extensive than 
necessary. 
(3) The association provides procedural safeguards which as-
sure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnish a 
basis for judicial review.205 
2. The Rule of Reason 
In spite of the strong language used by the Supreme Court, there 
have been numerous lower court decisions upholding various types 
of self-regulatory schemes that have the effect of a boycott.206 A 
number of commentators have attempted to reconcile these cases 
with the Supreme Court's apparent hostility to all forms of con-
certed refusals to deal,207 but the explanations given for these deci-
sions are almost as numerous as the cases themselves. Inasmuch as 
the eligibility rule is a central provision of the professional foot-
ball's draft system, which is arguably a self-regulatory scheme, it is 
necessary to venture into this legal "no man's land." 
Consolidated Air Tour, 467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972)). See also L. SuLLIVAN, supra note 
40, at 247. 
204 J. WEISTART & C. LowELL, supra note 29, at 599; see also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro 
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
•o• See United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 487 F. Supp. 1008, 1015-
16 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (D. Conn. 1977), injunction 
reinstated sub nom. Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). See also Comment, Trade 
Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1486 (1966). 
208 See North American Soccer League v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd 
in part & rev'd in part, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982). See also Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd on other 
grounds, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Deesen v. Prorl 
Golfer's Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966). 
207 See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 40, at 229-33; Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a 
Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705 (1962); Comment, Player Control Mechanisms 
in Professional Sports, 34 U. PITT. L. REv. 645 (1973). 
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In an effort to establish some guidelines, Professor Sullivan pro-
poses that only classic boycotts should be per se violations while 
other forms of concerted action should be analyzed under the rule 
of reason. 208 A classic boycott occurs when a group of competitors 
seek to protect themselves from competition from non-group mem-
bers by taking concerted action aimed directly at depriving their 
competitors of some essential trade relationship. For example, in 
order to drive a troublesome price-cutter out of the market, a 
group of automobile manufacturers might agree to stop buying 
steel from a supplier unless the supplier refused to sell its product 
to the non-group auto manufacturer.209 Since under these circum-
stances the purpose is clearly anticompetitive, there is no justifica-
tion for engaging in any extended factual analysis. The benefits of 
such an arrangement are minimal, and the dangers to competition 
are substantial. Thus, Professor Sullivan's approach is based on 
analyzing the purpose and effect of the agreement. If the purpose 
is anticompetitive, then it should be conclusively presumed illegal. 
If, on the other hand, the purpose of the practice is not to restrain 
competition, but its effect is anticompetitive, it should be analyzed 
under the rule of reason. 
This apparently is true even if the boycott is also used to achieve 
a reasonable program of industry self-regulation. In Silver,210 for 
example, the Court rejected the use of a boycott as a means of self-
policing. In holding that such action violated the Sherman Act, the 
Court stated that the reasons for the action were irrelevant.211 The 
Court further stated that the boycott, if not exempt under the Se-
curities and Exchange Act, would be a per se violation.212 
On the other hand, there are arrangements which do not have 
208 L. SuLLIVAN, supra note 40, at 229-33. 
209 The desired end can be achieved in a number of ways. For example, boycotting 
wholesalers may exclude from the wholesale level manufacturers or retailers seeking to inte-
grate vertically. Or, a group such as brokers may seek to protect themselves from competi-
tion from non-group members by concertedly ceasing to deal with them. Sometimes boycot-
ters coerce one or more suppliers or customers to stop dealing with the boycott target. I d. at 
230-31. 
210 373 u.s. 341 (1963). 
211 Id. at 365-66. 
212 Id. at 347. 
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the purpose of harming competition, but may nevertheless have 
the effect of a boycott. These are referred to as concerted refusals 
to deal.213 In these cases, a group of competitors agree to take some 
concerted action which has the effect of excluding a noncompetitor 
from the market place. For example, a group of soft drink manu-
facturers might agree to not use saccharin in their product. The 
effect of this arrangement ~s that none of the manufacturers will 
deal with the supplier of saccharin. This arrangement has neither 
the purpose nor the effect of the classic boycott, which is to put a 
competitor out of business. Thus, in Sullivan's view, it should be 
judged by the rule of reason. 
Another commentator, using an approach developed by Profes-
sor Coons, has taken a somewhat different view of the problem. 
According to this approach, the legality of the concerted action 
should be judged by whether its purpose is commercial, motivated 
by pursuit of profit, or noncommercial.214 If the group's purpose is 
commercial,2115 it should be judged by the traditional rules which 
apply to boycotts. If, on the other hand, the group's purpose is 
noncommercial and is found to further a socially beneficial goal, 
then it should be upheld. 216 
This approach appears to be unworkable in the present situa-
tion. A group of noncompetitors will always have only noncommer-
cial purposes in mind when they engage in any concerted action. 
For example, a group of parents who agree to boycott an X-rated 
movie theatre are only interested in protecting themselves, their 
families, and their neighborhood from the influence of the theatre. 
On the other hand, the purposes of a group of competitors will 
213 See L. SuLLIVAN, supra note 40, at 256-59. 
214 Comment, supra note 207. 
210 Purpose should be differentiated from intent. A group's purpose is its ultimate goal, 
while its intent is its immediate goal. Thus, in a group of private citizens who agree to 
withdraw their patronage from those theatres which show X-rated movies, for example, 
their purpose would be to promote public morality and their intent would be to bring eco-
nomic sanctions upon those owners who show X-rated movies. Id. at 656-57. 
218 At least as regards the services of football players, there is no doubt that the teams 
are competitors. See North American Soccer League v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982). Professor Coons observes 
that "in any case involving businessmen acting with reference to their businesses, the Court 
will disregard any oddment of non-commercial purpose." Coons, supra note 207, at 727. 
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generally be both commercial and noncommercial. For example, a 
league would probably seek to justify the rule because it insures 
that each player will have an opportunity for a college education,217 
promotes player safety218 and is necessary to insure a pool of tal-
ented players for the League. 219 While the first two reasons are 
nonprofit oriented, the third reason is basically economic in na-
ture. When the purposes are a mixture of economic and 
noneconomic reasons, this second approach breaks down because it 
offers no guidance as to how such a case should be handled. More-
over, even if this approach could be modified to deal with these 
cases, it appears that the Supreme Court would not accept this line 
of analysis of "noncommercial' schemes which are adopted by 
competitors. 220 
The rule of reason approach is nevertheless consistent with the 
view that professional football differs significantly from most other 
business ventures since the professional football teams, for most 
purposes, are not competitors in the economic sense.221 In Smith v. 
217 See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text. 
218 See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text. 
219 See infra text accompanying note 255. 
220 In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961), for 
example, the defendant operated a testing laboratory for gas appliances and refused to give 
its "seal of approval" to an appliance found to be safe. Citing Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), the Supreme Court held that the denial of the seal fell 
within the per se rule. The Court found that competitors of plaintiff had influenced the 
association and caused it to withhold approval of plaintiff's burner by using tests not based 
on objective standards. Id. at 659-60. 
221 NCAA v. Board of Regents, _ U.S. _, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984), involved a television 
contract that imposed price and output restraints which would have traditionally been 
viewed asperse violations. The Court, however, held that it would apply the rule of reason 
to this case since the industry was one in which horizontal restraints on competition were 
essential if the product was to be available at all. Arguably, the Court could follow the same 
approach in the case of the draft eligibility rule even if it might otherwise be considered a 
per se group boycott. The League might argue that since its teams are not competitors in 
the economic sense it should be viewed as a single economic entity and thus not capable of 
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. In cases not involving player restraints, both the 
National Hockey League and the National Basketball Association have successfully argued 
that they are joint ventures which are exempt from the purview of the Sherman Act. See 
San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Levin v. NBA, 385 
F. Supp. 149, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In North American Soccer League v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 
659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), atf'd in part, rev'd in part, & remanded, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), 
the NFL successfully argued that its acts were those of a single economic entity. In Smith v. 
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Pro Football, Inc.,222 the D.C. circuit court viewed the NFL as ba-
sically a joint venture which provides an entertainment prod-
uct-football games and telecasts. Since this is the case, no team is 
interested in driving any other team out of business because this 
would ultimately lead to the failure of the entire league. As a prac-
tical matter, the leagues may thus be more closely analogous to a 
profession than to a business venture. 223 If so, the leagues arguably 
would be free to vary their practices with regard to how they pro-
vide their product.224 It should be noted, however, that in regard to 
talent the teams do compete in the identifiable market of college 
Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court rejected the single entity argument. This inconsistency was 
explained in the North American Soccer case when the court stated: 
If member teams of a professional sports league compete with each other in an 
identical market, § 1 of the Sherman Act applies; the legality of restraints on such 
competition is judged by the rule of reason ..•. Thus the single economic entity 
defense fails in the player contract restriction cases, where all member teams com-
pete with each other for players, and league restraint of that competition damages 
the players. 
Id. at 677. 
222 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). In this case, Smith challenged the legality of the NFL player chart as it existed 
in 1968. Basically, he claimed that but for the draft he would have negotiated a far more 
lucrative contract if he could have negotiated with any of the NFL teams rather than only 
with the team who drafted him. 
The Court found that the draft violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, holding that the 
draft had an anticompetitive impact on the market for players services and that the draft's 
allegedly pro-competitive effect upon playing field equality among teams did not encourage 
competition in the economic sense. 593 F.2d at 1187-89. 
223 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89 n.17 (1975), where the 
Court stated: 
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a busi-
ness is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint vio-
lates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions 
as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to 
the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public ser-
vice aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular 
practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in 
another context, be treated differently. 
224 It should }?e pointed out, however, that joint ventures do not enjoy blanket immu-
nity under the Sherman Act. In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 
598 (1951), the Court specifically stated that agreements between legally separated compa-
nies which reduce competition among themselves cannot be justified by calling the activity a 
joint venture. 
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football players. 225 
The Supreme Court in National Society of Professional Engi-
neers v. United States,226 has recently limited the scope of inquiry 
under the rule of reason by stating categorically that the rule con-
trary to its name, "does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to 
any argument in favor of a challenged restraint which may fall 
within the realm of reason."227 The inquiry must be "confined to a 
consideration of [the restraint's] impact on competitive condi-
tions."228 The purpose of antitrust analysis, the Court concluded, 
"is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the 
restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition 
is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an 
industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy deci-
sion has been made by the Congress."229 This language, coupled 
with the Court's statement that the "true test of legality is whether 
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may sup-
press or even destroy competition,"230 suggests that a group of bus-
inessmen could not justify their restrictive conduct on the basis of 
some noneconomic benefit (for example, the protection of the pub-
lic health). 
B. Application to Sports Leagues 
Relying on Professional Engineers, the D.C. circuit in Smith v. 
Pro Football, Inc.231 declared that the National Football League 
draft, as it existed in 1968, was illegal. Using a rule of reason ap-
proach, the court found that the draft was anticompetitive both in 
purpose and effect. 232 Since the purpose of the draft was to restrict 
22
• Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Mackey v. NFL, 
543 F.2d 606, 617 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
228 National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1980); see 
also NCAA v. Board of Regents, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 2962 (1984). 
227 I d. at 688. 
228 Id. at 690. 
220 Id. at 692. 
230 I d. at 691 (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)). 
231 593 F.2d 1173, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
232 Id. at 1187. 
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competition among the NFL clubs for services of college players, it 
was designed to limit competition. In addition, the draft forced 
each seller of football services to deal with only one buyer, thus 
robbing the seller of his bargaining power. 
The D.C. circuit court rejected the League's argument that the 
draft was necessary to maintain competitive balance, stating that 
while the draft might help to maintain competition on the field, it 
did not increase competition in the economic sense of encouraging 
others to enter the market.233 This being the case, the League's 
position boiled down to an assertion that competition in the mar-
ket for entering players would not serve the best interests of the 
public, the clubs, or the players themselves. This was insufficient 
because Professional Engineers foreclosed such noneconomic justi-
fication. The court reasoned that a player draft system could sur-
vive scrutiny under the rule of reason only after demonstration of 
positive, economically pro-competitive benefits that offset its an-
ticompetitive effects, or at least of legitimate business purposes 
and an insubstantial anticompetitive effect. 234 
The question of whether player restraints in general should be 
treated as per se illegal or judged under the rule of reason has re-
cently received much attention. In light of the uncertainty embod-
ied in the Supreme Court cases, it is not surprising that the sports 
cases have not produced a definitive answer. Initially, courts were 
reluctant to apply the per se rule to the sports cases because of the 
industry's unique economic position.235 These cases were followed 
by a series of decisions which looked more favorably on the per se 
233 Id. at 1184-88. 
234 The Court stated that: 
[U]nder the Supreme Court's decision in Professional Engineers, no draft can be 
justified merely by showing that it is a relatively less anticompetitive means of 
attaining sundry benefits for the football industry and society. Rather, a player 
draft can survive scrutiny under the rule of reason only if it is demonstrated to 
have positive, economically procompetitive benefits that offset its anticompetitive 
effects, or, at the least, if it is demonstrated to accomplish legitimate business 
purposes and to have a net anticompetitive effect that is insubstantial. 
Id. at 1188-89. 
23
" See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 801 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Philadelphia 
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 503-04 (E.D. 
Pa. 1972). 
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approach. 236 It now appears that the pendulum is swinging back 
toward the rule of reason. 237 
While some authorities have indicated that the approach used to 
analyze player restraints is immaterial, since "these divergent 
paths presumably will lead ... to the same destination,"238 this is 
not necessarily the case. In Professional Engineers the Supreme 
Court found that under the rule of reason, a restraint of trade 
could not be justified by reasons unrelated to the market place.239 
The Court rejected the association's attempt to justify its refusal 
to discuss prices as necessary to protect the public from poor engi-
neering practices. If this approach to the rule is used to determine 
the legality of the draft rule, then noneconomic reasons such as 
insuring that young athletes receive a college education or player 
safety could not be considered. 
On the other hand, if the Silver exception is applied, 
noneconomic reasons might be considered. As discussed earlier all 
that is required is that the collective action (1) accomplish an end 
consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation; (2) is reasona-
bly related to that goal; and (3) is no more extensive than neces-
sary. 240 In Silver, the Court pointed out that protection of the pub-
lic interest in safeguarding investors as well as promotion of the 
general confidence in the Exchange would justify refusing to deal 
with an unreliable non-member.241 
Since it is uncertain which approach might be employed by a 
court in determining the legality of the draft eligibility rule, it is 
236 Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), atf'd in part & rev'd in part, 
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. 
Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), atf'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 
(N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 
907 (1979); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 
1971). 
237 See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Mackey v. 
NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 US. 801 (1977); McCourt v. Califor-
nia Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). 
238 593 F.2d at 1179 n.22. 
239 National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1980); 
see also NCAA v. Board of Regents, _ U.S. _, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 2962 (1984). 
240 See supra text accompanying notes 201-05. 
241 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 355-56 (1963). 
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analyzed first under the per se test and then under the rule of 
reason. 
1. Per Se Illegality 
There have been two professional sports cases outside profes-
sional football which have dealt with practices similar to profes-
sional football's draft eligibility rule. In both of these cases the 
courts used a per se approach. In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Man-
agement, Inc./42 Spencer Haywood successfully challenged the Na-
tional Basketball Association (NBA) rule which prohibited a quali-
fied player from negotiating with any NBA team until four years 
after his high school class graduation. The outcome was the same 
in Linseman v. World Hockey Association,243 in which a nineteen-
year-old amateur hockey player challenged the World Hockey As-
sociation (WHA) rule prohibiting a player under the age of twenty 
from playing with any WHA team. 
In both cases, the same reasons were advanced for the rule. In 
All-Pro, it was first contended that the four-year rule was a more 
efficient and less expensive way to train young basketball players 
than a farm system. Second, the NBA argued that the rule was a 
financial necessity to the League as a business enterprise. Finally, 
the League contended that the rule was necessary to guarantee 
that each professional basketball prospect was given an opportu-
nity to complete college.244 
The court, in rejecting the first argument, stated that the case 
did not come within the Silver exception since the NBA rule made 
no provision for even the most rudimentary hearing before the rule 
was applied. 245 The absolute nature of the rule also troubled the 
court since it prohibited the signing of not only college players but 
also those who did not or could not attend college.246 The court 
242 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
243 493 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977). Although the court did not specifically use the 
words "per se" in its opinion, it is clear that this approach was employed since only cases 
which were decided under the per se doctrine were cited by the court. 
244 325 F. Supp. at 1066. 
240 Id. 
246 Id. 
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summarily dismissed the second contention by stating that "even 
if this were true, it would not, of course, provide a basis for anti-
trust exemption."247 
With regard to the guarantee of a college education, the court 
felt that such a justification could not override the objective of fos-
tering economic competition.248 It is unclear what the court meant 
by this statement. If Silver is truly an exception to the per se rule, 
then noneconomic reasons that are consistent with the exception 
should be considered. 
In Linseman, the WHA contended that the rule was necessary to 
insure a pool of talented teenagers for the Canadian junior teams, 
which developed players for the WHA.249 Without the rule, the Ca-
nadian Junior Hockey League would fail, since most talented teen-
agers would sign with professional teams. The court rejected these 
arguments and stated that "[t]he anti-trust laws do not admit 
[any] exceptions due to economic necessity."250 The court went on 
to observe that if professional hockey needed a training ground for 
its players, it should bear the cost of establishing a farm system. 
With All-Pro and Linse man as a backdrop, the draft rule can 
now be analyzed to determine whether it comes within the Silver 
exception. On its face, the rule is a concerted refusal to deal that 
restrains competition in the market for the services of college play-
ers. Unless it satisfies all three elements of the Silver exception, it 
is illegal per se. 
The first element of the Silver exception mandates that the in-
dustry structure require self-regulation. In the case of professional 
football, the self-regulation is justified because the nature of the 
business requires rules that enable it to maintain competitive bal-
ance and to function with reasonable efficiency. For example, some 
form of draft would seem to -be necessary to insure that the richest 
and best teams d.o not acquire all the best players. The NFL, and 
by implication the USFL, have at least tacitly been given the right 
••• Id. 
••• Id. 
••• 439 F. Supp. at 1322. 
••• Id. 
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of self-regulation. While there is no legislative mandate for self-
regulation, judicial approval abounds. 251 Thus, the first element of 
the Silver test has been satisfied. 
Under the second element of the Silver exception, the rule must 
further the goal of self-regulation. As in All-Pro, the leagues can be 
expected to argue that their rule is consistent with self-regulation 
since it is intended to ensure that all prospective players at least 
have the opportunity to obtain a college degree, an important fac-
tor because a professional football career is temporary at best. 2 c;2 
The goal of ensuring a college education, while commendable, 
bears no clear relationship to the reasons for allowing the leagues 
to regulate themselves. It does not aid in maintaining competitive 
balance253 or in protecting the leagues' integrity.254 Moreover, even 
if it could be said that the rule does further some relevant goal, it 
is certainly more extensive than necessary. The rule applies to all 
players including those who do not want to go to college and those 
who are intellectually or financially unable to do so. 
Without college football there would be no organized system for 
the development of a pool of talented prospects. Since college play-
ers are the primary source of talent, it is necessary that the leagues 
maintain good relations with the colleges. The rule also benefits 
the colleges since many teams rely heavily on one or two athletes. 
Thus, the real reason for the rule is that, as a practical matter, the 
use of college-developed talent is a more efficient and less expen-
sive way to train new players. 
••• In Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), a{f'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979), the court noted that the Justice Department ac-
knowledged that professional sports teams needed some joint agreements to assure contin-
ued viability, and also that Congress had, through various actions, recognized this need. /d. 
at 79 n.3, 80 n.4. See also Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 
434 u.s. 801 (1977). 
••• See Comment, Herschel Walker v. National Football League: A Hypothetical Law-
suit Challenging the Propriety of the National Football League's Four-or-Five Year Rule 
Under the Sherman Act, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 603, 631 (1982). 
••• In Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court affirmed the 
district court's finding that there was no correlation between the draft and maintaining 
competitive balance. Id. at 1183 . 
... Accord Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
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If the goal of the rule is to insure an uninterrupted flow of talent 
to the leagues so that they can efficiently engage in competition, 
then its purpose is consistent with the policy justifying self-regula-
tion. This is even more true if, as in All-Pro, the leagues argue that 
their financial survival is at stake. What is unclear, however, is 
whether the rule is reasonably related to this goal. Considering the 
number of professional football teams (forty-six) it is unlikely that 
the loss of a few talented players from some college teams would 
have any great impact on college football. Certainly the loss of a 
superstar (for example, Walker) by a school (for example, Georgia) 
will have a more severe impact on the championship prospects of a 
particular team and thus cause a certain loss of goodwill.255 The 
drafting of Walker by the USFL has lead to a great deal of animos-
ity between the USFL and the colleges.256 Nevertheless, it is un-
likely that such "raiding" would destroy college football as a pool 
of potential professional players since there are relatively few ath-
letes who are capable of playing professional football without the 
benefit of four years of college competition. Moreover, the elimina-
tion of the rule may also have the effect of restoring amateurism 
and academic integrity to college football. For many colleges, ath-
letics is big business.257 Many schools fiercely compete for star high 
school athletes who will fill their stadiums and coffers to overflow-
ing. This mad pursuit of talent has led to many abuses, such as 
paying college players258 and admitting students who lack the mo-
tivation or intellectual tools to succeed academically.259 If the rule 
were eliminated, then those athletes who are either unwilling or 
unable to attend college will be eligible to play professional foot-
ball. Some of the temptation for colleges to commit recruiting vio-
lations would be removed . 
... s. GALLNER, PRO SPORTS: THE CONTRACT GAME 5-6 (1974). 
••• Most college coaches reacted with anger when Walker turneci pro. U.S.A. Today, 
Feb. 24, 1983, at 3C. 
207 See Comment, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: HEW Gets Serious About 
Equality in Sports? 15 NEw ENG. L. REv. 573, 591 n.84 (1981). 
••• For example, Digger Phelps, Notre Dame basketball coach, stated that a number of 
colleges across the country are paying a standard rate of $10,000 a year to outstanding play-
ers. Detroit Free Press, Mar. 27, 1982, at 7D. 
••• See generally Waucukauski, The Regulating of Academic Standards in Intercolle-
giate Athletics, 1982 ARiz. ST. L.J. 79. 
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It should be noted that in Linseman, the court rejected this ar-
gument by stating that "the anti-trust laws do not admit of excep-
tions due to economic necessity."260 Yet, if Silver truly allows for 
an exception to the per se rule, then the justification of economic 
necessity, provided it is consistent with the policy underlying self-
regulation, should be permitted. As a practical matter, however, 
economic necessity will not be a serious issue in any case involving 
the NFL and probably not in the case of the USFL. It is unlikely 
that the signing of a few exceptional players will endanger the exis-
tence of college football.261 
The leagues might also argue that the rule is necessary to pro-
tect a young player who has not yet reached full physical develop-
ment. There is no question that football is a violent, dangerous 
sport.262 Certainly, a rule protecting the safety of players would be 
an end consistent with a policy justifying self-regulation.263 In its 
present form, however, the rule is overly broad since it bars all 
players without regard to their physical prowess.264 It is difficult to 
believe that any player with physical attributes similar to Walker, 
who stands six feet tall and weighs 200 pounds, is in any physical 
danger when he steps onto the playing field. If, in fact, there is 
260 Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (D. Conn. 1977). 
261 Since 1976 an average of fewer than eight players a year have applied for the NBA 
draft. Fifty-nine players have applied, forty-three were drafted, fifteen were not drafted and 
one withdrew. Letter from National Basketball Association (April 18, 1984). The trend ap-
pears to be for players to stay in school. Kirkpatrick, Hello, America, We Came Back, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, December 1, 1980, at 36. 
262 The seriousness of the violence problem can best be analyzed through injury 
statistics. From 1969-1974 ... NFL players suffered an estimated 5,110 injuries. 
A followup study of serious sports injuries reported that serious football injuries in 
1974 increased 25 per cent over the previous season. During that year, a survey of 
NFL team trainers revealed that injuries increased to an estimated record 1,638. 
That is, 12 injuries for every 10 players. 
R. HORROW, SPORTS VIOLENCE 7-8 (1980) (citations omitted). 
283 In Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979), a one-eyed player challenged a 
League rule preventing him from competing in the League. The court found that the rule's 
primary purpose was the promotion of safety and that there was no anticompetitive 
purpose. 
26
' While this point was not expressly addressed in Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. Supp. 
1315 (D. Conn. 1977), it appears that the court, by implication, has rejected such an argu-
ment since it struck down the National Hockey League's 20-year-old rule allowing a 19-
year-old player to compete. 
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concern for the safety of individual players, each candidate could 
be required to undergo an extensive physical examination prior to 
his eligibility for the draft. 
The third element of the Silver exception requires that the asso-
ciation provide procedural safeguards to assure the restraint is not 
arbitrary and furnish a basis for judicial review.265 A search of the 
NFL's Constitution and By-Laws does not reveal any provision 
which even remotely satisfies this requirement. To the contrary, 
the League rules give the commissioner "the power, without a 
hearing, to disapprove contracts between a player and a club, if 
such a contract has been executed in violation of or contrary to the 
Constitution and By-Laws of the League .... "266 With one excep-
tion, the draft eligibility rule has been uniformly applied to ex-
clude all prospective players.267 Even in the one case in which a 
player was allowed to play before his class graduated, the decision 
was reached because of an antitrust suit rather than under proce-
dural rules established by the league.268 
The lack of any procedural safeguards, coupled with an almost 
rigid application of the rule, is fatal. It was just such a situation 
which led the court, in All-Pro, to strike down an identical NBA 
rule.269 In response to the court's ruling, the NBA adopted a 
"hardship rule"270 that permitted the Commission to allow an ath-
lete who is suffering severe economic hardship to be drafted prior 
to graduation. This rule was applied so liberally in the NBA that, 
as a practical matter, anyone who merely claimed hardship was 
drafted. Finally, in 1976, the NBA relaxed its eligibility rules so 
that a player whose high school class has graduated may become 
eligible for the draft by giving the League written notice forty-five 
days before renouncing his college eligibility.271 Even if the leagues 
adopted a hardship rule, it could still be too strict. In All-Pro the 
260 See supra note 205. 
266 NFL CoNST. AND BY-LAws art. VIII, § 8.14(A) (1976). 
267 L. SoBEL, supra note 11, at 466. 
26s Id. 
289 Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. 1971). See 
also Cooney v. American Horse Shows Ass'n, 495 F. Supp. 424, 430 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
270 All-Pro, 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
271 L. SoBEL, supra note 11, at 248. 
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court stated: 
In addition, it is uncontested that the rules in question are 
absolute and prohibit the signing of not only college basket-
ball players but also those who do not desire to attend college 
and even those who lack the mental and financial ability to 
do so. As such they are overly broad and thus 
• 272 Improper .... 
The court's statement implies that a draft eligibility rule may be 
applied to those who enroll in college, provided they may become a 
professional if hardship required, but may not be applied to those 
who elect not to be enrolled in college at all. Such a rule might 
make an unfair distinction between those high school graduates 
who decide to turn professional immediately and those who choose 
to attend college. In any event, the rule still would violate the anti-
trust laws since it would not satisfy the first and second elements 
of the Silver exception. 
2. Rule of Reason 
To justify the draft eligibility rule under the rule of reason the 
leagues would have to establish that the restraint merely regulates 
and perhaps promotes competition rather than suppresses it.273 As 
stated previously, a court in applying the rule of reason will first 
look at the alleged restraint to determine whether it has any legiti-
mate business purpose. It will then balance this purpose against 
the burdensome competition to ascertain whether the former out-
weighs the latter. A restraint is unreasonable if it has the net effect 
of substantially impeding competition. 274 
In most, if not all, of the prior litigation in which the NFL was 
involved, the League argued that the restraint it had imposed was 
necessary to insure competitive balance.275 Generally, the courts 
272 All-Pro, 325 F. Supp. at 1066. 
273 National Soc'y of Profl Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1980) (quot-
ing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)) . 
.,. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
216 Id. at 1179; Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 
U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 
HeinOnline -- 33 Emory L. J. 437 1984
1984] PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL'S DRAFT 437 
have accepted this as a legitimate business purpose in light of the 
League's unique position. 276 
If, however, the courts follow the lead of the Smith decision, the 
competitive balance argument will be of little benefit. In Smith the 
Court stated that a restraint could be justified only by demonstrat-
ing that it had positive, economically pro-competitive benefits that 
offset anticompetitive effects277 or, in the alternative, accomplished 
some legitimate business purpose while having only an insubstan-
tial anticompetitive effect.278 The authors have been unable to con-
struct any argument which would satisfy this version of the rule of 
reason. 
The leagues might contend that the rule is necessary to protect 
their source of talented football players. 279 If college football were 
to be severely injured or completely destroyed by elimination of 
the rule, the leagues' continued existence might be jeopardized. 
They would be faced with the alternatives of either investing huge 
sums of money to develop farm systems or drafting less exper-
ienced high school players. It appears, however, that no such dire 
consequences would flow from the abolition of the rule. There are 
over 1,700 colleges and universities in the United States/80 most of 
which have football teams. The loss of a few players to the draft 
each year would have little impact. Since the NBA's draft eligibil-
ity rule was abolished in 1976, very few basketball players have 
joined the professional ranks prior to expiration of their college eli-
gibility.281 Thus, while the rule is convenient for the leagues, it ap-
pears that its overall competitive benefits are slight. Moreover, 
elimination of the rule may go a long way toward restoring ama-
teurism to college football. Each season college teams are penalized 
for recruiting violations, most of which involve paying students to 
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). 
276 See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
277 Id. at 1188-89. 
278 I d. at 1189. 
279 This contention was summarily dismissed in Linseman and All-Pro where the per se 
approach was used. Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (D. Conn. 1977); Denver 
Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
280 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 755 (35th ed. 1981) (Jist of accredited schools). 
281 See supra note 261. 
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play football.282 If the rule is eliminated, those players who are 
more interested in the financial rewards available as a professional 
could declare themselves eligible for the draft. 
Even if competitive balance were a legitimate factor in a rule of 
reason analysis, it is far from clear how the four-year rule can pos-
sibly advance the cause of competitive balance.283 Unlike the draft, 
which insures that weaker teams are permitted to select first so 
that they can obtain the best players, the four-year rule restricts 
all teams equally. 
The draft eligibility rule has a severe anticompetitive impact on 
the market for player services. The career of a professional athlete 
is relatively short. 284 Thus, the loss of even one or two years of 
playing time can be very detrimental. 285 Moreover, if the player is 
forced to remain in college to play football, there is the ever-pre-
sent threat of incurring a serious injury that would end his ca-
reer.286 Finally, the fact that a player might compete in the Cana-
dian Football League or some semi-professional league would not 
lessen the anticompetitive impact of the rule. In Smith, the court 
rejected the alternative of playing in the Canadian Football 
League, citing the factors of that League's hiring preference for 
Canadian players, low salaries, and few promotional 
opportunities. 287 
On balance, the rule is manifestly unreasonable. It bars all play-
ers, regardless of intelligence or financial capability, from playing 
professional football without advancing competition in any signifi-
282 See supra note 258. 
283 During the 1960's some stronger clubs drafted "red shirts" (college players who did 
not play in a particular year but who were eligible to play in the future). By doing this, they 
could stockpile future players. Rights of Professional Athletes: Hearings on H.R. 2355 and 
H.R. 694 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1975) (testimony of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, 
National Football League). 
284 Both because of injury and age, the length of the average career of an NFL player is 
just 4.6 years. R. HORROW, supra note 262, at 9. 
28
' In Linseman the court stated that the plaintiff hockey player would suffer irrepara-
ble injury if he were prevented from playing for even one year. Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. 
Supp. 1315, 1319 (D. Conn. 1977). 
288 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
287 Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1185 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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cant way. Even if a hardship draft were instituted, it is unlikely 
that it would withstand scrutiny since there are no real competi-
tive benefits from the rule. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
Professional football's draft eligibility rules are an unreasonable 
restraint of trade.288 The NFL's rule cannot be legitimized by its 
inclusion in the collective bargaining agreement between the 
League and the players' association. The circuit courts considering 
the circumstances under which collectively bargained player re-
straints will be immunized under the labor exemption to the anti-
trust laws, have formulated a three-prong test for making this 
judgment. This test represents a shorthand method for balancing 
the anticompetitive effects of the rule against its importance to la-
bor-a balance which must be struck in favor of labor for the ex-
emption to apply. The draft eligibility rule, in its present form, 
fails each prong of this test. In the broader view, the anticompeti-
tive effects of the rule far outweigh its importance to the players' 
association of its members and, therefore, tip the balance in favor 
of antitrust application. 
Examined under substantive antitrust principles, the rules vio-
late section 1 of the Sherman Act since they unreasonably restrain 
competition for the services of talented young football players. If 
the rules are categorized as a group boycott, they are illegal per se 
unless the Silver exception is applicable. The draft eligibility rules, 
however, are not subject to the exception since they are overbroad 
and do not further any goal or purpose reasonably necessary to the 
leagues' need for self-regulation. Furthermore, under existing 
league procedures, there are no provisions for any hearing for those 
players who wish to enter the leagues. 
If the rules are analyzed under the rule of reason, as many courts 
have done with other player restraints, they also violate antitrust 
laws. On balance, the rules effectively deny an entire class of able 
amateur football players an opportunity to play professionally 
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while aiding neither on-field nor off-the-field competition. There 
being no legally cognizable justification for them, the draft eligibil-
ity rules are unlawful. The eligibility of college undergraduates to 
be drafted and employed is clear. 
Some may argue that the rules promote college education or 
avoid the overreaching of young athletes. These considerations, 
however, are not sufficient legal justifications. Furthermore, given 
the current state of college athletics, it is doubtful that the draft 
eligibility rules have furthered these purposes. The invalidation of 
the rules, it is hoped, will lead to clearer distinctions between pro-
fessionalism and amateurism and promote the keenly felt need for 
the latter in college athletics. 
